

BA EXAMINATION 2009

for Internal Students

This paper is also taken by Combined Studies Students

PHILOSOPHY

4. Greek Philosophy from the Beginnings to Aristotle

Wednesday, 6 May 2009: 10am-1pm

Answer THREE questions, at least TWO from SECTION B. Avoid overlap in your answers.

SECTION A

1. In what sense, if any, does Heraclitus hold that everything is always changing?
2. Assess Parmenides' arguments for the claim that what is, is all together, one and continuous.
3. Does Zeno succeed in showing that it is impossible for an arrow to fly through the air?
4. Is Socrates' criticism of Anaxagoras justified when he says (Plato, *Phaedo*) that Anaxagoras introduces Mind as an explanatory principle but makes no use of it?
5. What is the nature and function of void in atomism?

SECTION B

6. To what philosophical puzzle or puzzles is Plato's theory of recollection a response? How else might one respond?
7. EITHER (a) 'No man can know the better and be able to do it, and yet be unwilling to do it and do something else.' Assess Socrates' argument for this conclusion.

OR (b) Assess the role of the 'spirited part' in Plato's account of the soul.

8. What is the role of the 'unhypothesised starting-point' in the *Republic*? How could the Form of the Good play that role?
9. 'If the theory of Forms is to explain anything, then Forms must be self-predicating (for instance, the Form of Beauty must be beautiful). But self-predicating Forms are absurd; therefore the theory of Forms cannot explain anything.' Discuss.
10. EITHER (a) How successful is Socrates' attack in the *Theaetetus* on Protagoras' doctrine that 'Man is the measure of all things, of the things that are, how they are, of the things that are not, how they are not'?

OR (b) How effective are Socrates' attempts to explain false judgement in the *Theaetetus*?
11. 'In the *Sophist* Plato suggests that "being" can be said in many ways.' Discuss.
12. What, in Aristotle's *Categories*, is a primary substance? Assess his reasons for adopting this view.
13. Can particulars be known? Discuss with reference to Aristotle's answer.
14. Is Aristotle right to think that we need to invoke final causes in explaining the natural world?
15. What problems arise from Aristotle's account of time in the *Physics*? Are they insurmountable?
16. Explain Aristotle's distinction between substantial and accidental change.
17. According to Aristotle, what requirements must be satisfied for a belief to count as understanding or knowledge (*epistêmê*)? Are these requirements too strict?
18. Does Aristotle refute the claim that tomorrow's sea-battle is necessary?
19. EITHER (a) 'Each sense receives the perceptible forms without their matter' (*De Anima* II.12). Discuss.

OR (b) Give a critical assessment of Aristotle's account of 'imagination' (*phantasia*).
20. Assess Aristotle's claim that there is a mind that makes and a mind that is made.

TURN OVER

21. Comment critically on ONE of the following passages:

a. Now in all but a brief part of the discourse I have just completed I have presented what has been crafted by Intellect. But I need to match that account by providing a comparable one concerning the things that have come about by Necessity. For this ordered world is of mixed birth: it is the offspring of a union of Necessity and Intellect. Intellect prevailed over Necessity by persuading it to direct most of the things that come to be toward what is best, and the result of this subjugation of Necessity to wise persuasion was the initial formation of this universe. So if I'm to tell the story of how it really came to be in this way, I'd also have to introduce the character of the Straying Cause: how it is its nature to set things adrift.

(Plato, *Timaeus* 47e-48a)

b. If matter is not a substance, it is hard to see what else could be; for when all else is taken off, nothing apparent remains. For while other things are attributes, products, and capacities of bodies, length, breadth, and depth are quantities and not substances (for a quantity is not a substance). Rather, the substance is that primary thing to which these quantities belong. And yet when length, breadth, and depth are taken away, we see nothing remaining unless there be something which is determined by these. So on this view it must appear that matter alone is substance. (By matter I mean what is not said to be in its own right any thing, or any quantity, or anything else by which being is determined. For there is something of which each of these is predicated, and which itself has a being different from that of each of the predicates – for while others are predicated of substance, substance is predicated of matter – and so the last thing will not be in its own right either a something, or of any quantity, or anything else at all. Nor will it be in its own right the negations of these, for they too will belong to it only coincidentally.)

(Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Z 3, 1029a10-26)

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