

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

BA EXAMINATION 2009

for Internal Students

This paper is also taken by Combined Studies Students

PHILOSOPHY

Optional subject (m): Indian Philosophy

Answer THREE questions. Avoid overlap in your answers.

1. How does the Aristotelian syllogism differ from the five-membered Naiyāyika 'demonstration' or 'inference for another' (*parārthānumāna*)? Is one better than the other as an account of inferential reasoning?
2. As an account of how we argue soundly from premises to conclusions, critically evaluate Nyāya's threefold division of inference (*anumāna*) into 'from what precedes' (*pūrvavat*), 'from what remains' (*śeṣavat*) and 'seen in common' (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*).
3. Assess the adequacy of the Nyāya doctrine of the five kinds of pseudo-reason (*hetvābhāsa*) for explaining the ways in which inferences may fail to reach true conclusions.
4. Critically evaluate Dignāga's doctrine of the 'triple character' (*trairūpya*) that a reason (*hetu*) must possess in order to secure the validity of an inference (*anumāna*).
5. Which gives a better account of the sense and reference of empty terms, the Buddhist 'assertion of what is not' (*asatkhyāti*) or the Naiyāyika 'assertion of what is otherwise' (*anyathākhyāti*)?
6. EITHER (a) What made it so difficult for Nyāya to give a coherent account of partially locatable properties? Did the School eventually succeed in giving one?

OR (b) Why was it so problematical for Old Nyāya to formulate a definition of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), especially where ubiquitous properties are concerned? Did New Nyāya do any better?

TURN OVER

7. Assess the merits and the disadvantages of Nyāya's strategy of defining and classifying things by means of property-abstraction.
8. Assess the Buddhist arguments against the existence of the self.
9. Critically evaluate the debate between Nyāya and Abhidharma Buddhism over the existence of substances.
10. Assess the Yogācāra Buddhist arguments against the existence of physical objects.
11. Assess Nāgārjuna's argument for the claim that it is impossible to establish a valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).
12. Is Nāgārjuna's doctrine of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) self-refuting?
13. Does Dignāga's doctrine of exclusion (*apoha*) succeed in supplying an account of kind-terms that renders superfluous the Nyāya doctrine of universals (*sāmānya*)?
14. Is Jainism able to defend its Doctrine of Conditional Affirmation (*syādvāda*) against the charges of self-contradiction (*virodha*) and uncertainty (*saṃśaya*)?
15. How successful is Śāṅkara in providing a metaphysical account of the world that is consistent with Advaita Vedānta's doctrine of absolute unity?
16. Is the claim that one's self is identical with Brahman rationally defensible?

END OF PAPER