

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

088 0230

BA EXAMINATION 2009

for Internal Students

This paper is also taken by combined students

PHILOSOPHY

Optional subject (q): The Philosophies of Frege, Russell, and the Early and Late Wittgenstein

Thursday, 30 April 2009: 10am – 1 pm

Answer THREE questions. Candidates must answer on at least TWO philosophers. (The early and late Wittgenstein count as two philosophers.) Avoid overlap in your answers.

A. Frege

1. Discuss Frege's criticism of the conception of predication involved in Aristotelian term logic.
2. Is Frege's conception of analyticity an improvement over Kant's?
3. Having insisted that numbers are objects and not concepts, Frege claims that he could have defined 'The number of Fs' as the concept equinumerous to the concept F. Are these claims inconsistent?
4. Discuss the connection between Frege's theory of concepts and the sense/reference distinction.
5. Does the unsaturated character of concepts explain the unity of the proposition?

B. Russell

6. Assess the strengths and weaknesses of the theory of propositions that Russell presented in his *Principles of Mathematics*.

TURN OVER

7. What was the philosophical significance of Russell's conceiving the word 'the' as an 'incomplete symbol'?
8. Describe Russell's multiple relation theory of judgement. How did Wittgenstein criticise this theory? Was Russell right to abandon it?
9. In his theory of judgement of 1913, Russell conceived of asymmetric relations as lacking a 'sense' or 'direction'. Was he right to do so?
10. Do logical forms solve the problem for which they were introduced in Russell's 1913 account of understanding?

C. Early Wittgenstein

11. What, if anything, is correct about Wittgenstein's 'picture theory' of representation?
12. Does Wittgenstein offer a cogent argument for the existence of simple objects?
13. EITHER (a) What role is played in Wittgenstein's system by the contention that a proposition is a fact?

OR (b) 'The world is the totality of facts, not of things' (*Tractatus* 1.1). Discuss.
14. EITHER (a) How can the constituents of a proposition be related to one another *in the same way* as their referents would be related to one another if the proposition were true?

OR (b) Why can't propositions represent logical form?
15. EITHER (a) Assess the *Tractatus*' account of logical consequence.

OR (b) Explain the *Tractatus*' account of the necessity of necessary propositions. Is it correct?
16. EITHER (a) How seriously should we take Wittgenstein's claim that everything written in the *Tractatus* is strictly nonsense?

OR (b) How do propositions show what propositions can't say?

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D. Late Wittgenstein

17. According to Wittgenstein, what mistakes about language are contained in the Augustinian picture? Does he show that they are mistakes?
18. EITHER (a) 'What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation' (*Investigations* § 201). What does Wittgenstein mean by this? Has he shown it?
- OR (b) Does Wittgenstein offer a satisfactory solution to the rule-following paradox?
19. To what extent, if at all, is Wittgenstein a logical behaviourist?
20. Why should philosophy consist solely of helping flies out of fly bottles?
21. Does *On Certainty* offer an adequate response to scepticism about the external world?
22. EITHER (a) Is Wittgenstein right to reject the view that meaning is a mental process?
- OR (b) Why does Wittgenstein suppose the private linguist's definition of 'S' is an 'empty ceremony'? Is Wittgenstein correct?

END OF PAPER