

# **BA Intercollegiate Lectures in Epistemology and Methodology Autumn 2001: Scepticism, Truth-Tracking and A Priori Knowledge**

## **Readings 4: A priori knowledge**

The topic of a priori knowledge has been prominent in some recent articles by George Bealer, including

Bealer, George, “A priori knowledge and the scope of philosophy”, Philosophical Studies **91** (1996)

“The incoherence of empiricism”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume **66** (1987)

“On the possibility of philosophical knowledge”, Philosophical Perspectives 10 (1996)

“The a priori”, in John Greco and Ernest Sosa, eds., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology [Oxford: Blackwell 1998]

The last mentioned of these articles appears in a slightly different form in

DePaul, Michael, and William Ramsey, eds, Rethinking Intuition [Toronto: Rowman and Littlefield 1997]

along with some other useful material, especially the short article by Ernest Sosa. Bealer’s approach can be interestingly compared with that of Christopher Peacocke in

Peacocke, Christopher, “How are a priori truths possible?”, European Journal of Philosophy 1993

Quine’s attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction is helpfully discussed by Paul Boghossian in an article entitled “Analyticity” in

Wright, Crispin, and Bob Hale, A Companion to the Philosophy of Language [Oxford: Blackwell 1998]

There is also a somewhat unsympathetic, but none the less perceptive discussion of Quine in Laurence Bonjour’s lengthy defence of a priori knowledge in

BonJour, Laurence, In Defence of Pure Reason [Cambridge: CUP 1998]