

BA Intercollegiate Lectures in Epistemology and Methodology

Autumn 2001: Scepticism, Truth-Tracking and A Priori Knowledge

Readings 3: Reliabilism and internalism

The articles in the Blackwell Guide by Ernest Sosa and Laurence Bonjour provide a very helpful overview of the current state of debate between internalists and externalists in the theory of justification.

Some of the important points are aired in two papers from the late 1970's:

BonJour, Laurence: "Externalist theories of empirical knowledge", Midwest Studies in Philosophy V, 1980.

Goldman, Alvin: "What is justified belief?", in Justification and Knowledge, ed. George S. Pappas. (Dordrecht: Reidel 1979)

For the pressures that lead from Goldman's early causal theory of knowledge to the sort of counterfactual theory most prominently associated with Nozick, see the articles by Goldman and Dretske reprinted in Pappas and Swain:

Goldman, Alvin: "A causal theory of knowing", J.Phil. **64**, reprinted in Pappas and Swain, eds., and "Discrimination and perceptual knowledge", J.Phil. **73**, also in Pappas and Swain.

Dretske, Fred: "Conclusive reasons", Australasian J. Phil. **49**, reprinted in Pappas and Swain, eds.

The emergence of what is in effect a counterfactual theory is clearly visible in the later Goldman paper.

Internalism is attacked at some length in various parts of

Plantinga, Alvin: Warrant: the Current Debate (Oxford: OUP 1994)

Several papers in

Alston, William: Epistemic Justification (Cornell, Ithica: Cornell UP 1989)

discuss the internalist/externalist distinction in grim, but often illuminating detail.