

Bodily Sensations – Reading List

General Description

In this set of lectures, we shall be concerned with the nature of bodily sensation and how the existence of such phenomena bears on theories of consciousness and experience. Among the questions addressed are: Do sensations give us examples of mental objects? How are sensations related to bodily locations? Can we think of bodily sensations as examples of perception of the body?

- Anscombe, G.E.M. (1957) *Intention*, Oxford: Blackwell, esp. 13-14, 49-51.
- , (1962) 'On sensations of position', *Analysis*, 22: 55-8. Reprinted in her (1981) *Metaphysics & The Philosophy of Mind: Collected Papers, Vol. 2* Oxford: Blackwell. (Anscombe rejects the view that we observe our sensations, and suggests a dispositional account of sensation location.)
- Armstrong, D.M. (1962) *Bodily Sensations*, London: Routledge. (This is a spirited defence of the view that sensations are perceptions of one's body.)
- Descartes, R. (1984) 6th Meditation, in *Meditations on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Writings of René Descartes*, eds. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (This meditation contains an important discussion of the function of sensations, and the intimate connection between mind and body.)
- Valerie Gray Hardcastle, (1997) 'When a Pain is Not', *Journal of Philosophy*
- Jackson, F. (1977) *Perception*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ch. 3. (A defence of the view that there are inner objects of awareness.)
- Merleau-Ponty, M. (1963), *Phenomenology of Perception* (London: Routledge) (The first part of this book discusses the existence and nature of the 'phenomenal' body.)
- O'Shaughnessy, B. (1980) *The Will*, Vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chs. 5-7. (A detailed account of the need to attribute bodily locations to sensations.)
- , (1989) 'The Sense of Touch', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*
- , (2000) *Consciousness & The World*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Pt. IV.
- Peacocke, C. (1985) 'Consciousness and Other Minds', *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*, 59: 97-117
- Pitcher, G. (1970) 'Pain Perception', *Philosophical Review*, 79: 368-393. (Another defence of the view that bodily sensations are perceptions.)
- Reid, Thomas, (1983) *An Inquiry into the Human Mind*, Indianapolis: Hackett Ch. 5. (An account of the role of bodily sensations in outer perception.)
- Wittgenstein, L. (1952) *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford: Blackwell, secs. 242-315. (The famous private language argument which some philosophers take to be an attack on the idea of sensations as inner or private objects.)
- (1969) *Blue and Brown Books*, 2nd edition, Oxford: Blackwell, 49-55. (A discussion of the location and ownership of sensations.)