

BA Philosophy of Mind

Autumn 2000

Mind-Body Identity

Sarah Patterson

Thursday 6-7 Small Physics Lecture Theatre, Main Building, Birkbeck

Friday 12-1, 3B20, Strand, KCL

Sequence of Topics

Week 1 Introduction: Dualism and Behaviourism

Week 2 Type Identity Theory

Week 3 Functionalism

Week 4 Anomalous Monism

Week 5 Supervenience

Reading

Some introductory books:

*D. Braddon-Mitchell and F. Jackson, *Philosophy of Mind and Cognition* (Blackwell, 1996)

J. Heil, *Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction* (Routledge, 1998)

*J. Kim, *Philosophy of Mind* (Westview, 1996)

Some useful collections:

*N. Block (ed.), *Readings in Philosophy of Psychology* Vol. I (Methuen, 1980); abbreviated as RPP

S. Guttenplan (ed.), *A Companion to Philosophy of Mind* (Blackwell, 1994)

*W. Lycan (ed.), *Mind and Cognition: A Reader* (Blackwell, 1990); revised as *Mind and Cognition: An Anthology* (Blackwell, 1999). Abbreviated as MC

*D. Rosenthal (ed.), *The Nature of Mind* (OUP, 1991); abbreviated as NM

*D. Rosenthal (ed.), *Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem* (Hackett, 1987); abbreviated as MMBP

R. Warner and T. Szubka, *The Mind-Body Problem* (Blackwell, 1994)

Dualism and Behaviourism

G. Ryle, 'Descartes' Myth' in his *The Concept of Mind* (Hutchinson, 1949) and in NM

C. Hempel, 'The Logical Analysis of Psychology' in RPP

H. Putnam, 'Brains and Behaviour' in NM and RPP

N. Block, 'Psychologism and Behaviourism' *Phil. Rev.* 1981

Type Identity Theory

*J.J.C. Smart, 'Sensations and Brain Processes' in NM and MMBP

U.T. Place, 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process?' in MC

*D. Lewis, 'An Argument for the Identity Theory' in MMBP

*S. Kripke, Excerpt from 'Identity and Necessity' in RPP

*C. Peacocke, *Holistic Explanation* (Clarendon, 1979), pp. 134-43

Functionalism

*H. Putnam, 'The Nature of Mental States' in RPP, NM, MC

*D. Lewis, 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain' in RPP and NM

N. Block, 'What is Functionalism?' in RPP

N. Block, 'Troubles with Functionalism' in RPP

*S. Shoemaker, 'Some Varieties of Functionalism' *Phil. Topics* 1981; reprinted in his *Identity, Cause and Mind* (CUP, 1984)

Anomalous Monism

*D. Davidson, 'Mental Events' in RPP and NM

*J. Kim, 'Psychophysical Laws' in his *Supervenience and Mind* (CUP, 1993)

*S. Eynne, *Donald Davidson* (Polity, 1991), especially chs. 1 and 5

T. Crane, 'The Mental Causation Debate' *Proc. Arist. Soc. Supp. Vol. LXIX*, 1995

Supervenience

*D. Papineau, 'Why Supervenience?' *Analysis* 1990

*T. Horgan, 'From Supervenience to Superdupervenience' *Mind* 1993

*J. Kim, 'Concepts of Supervenience' in his *Supervenience and Mind* (CUP, 1993)

Readings marked with an asterisk '*' have been placed on Short Loan in Birkbeck College Library.

Sample Exam Questions

'If the causal role of a mental event is discharged by physical happening in the brain, then that mental event must be identified with those physical happenings.' Discuss.

'Type identity theories are too strong to be plausible; token identity theories are too weak to be explanatory.' Discuss.

'Pain cannot be identified with the firing of C-fibres because identity statements formed using rigid designators are necessary.' Discuss.

'Functionalism has all the advantages of behaviourism and type physicalism, and none of the disadvantages.' Is this true?

Does functionalism support or undermine the claim that identity relations hold between mental and physical states?