

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

088 0050

BA EXAMINATION 2008

for Internal Students

This paper is also taken by Combined Studies Students

PHILOSOPHY

4. Greek Philosophy from the beginnings to Aristotle

Wednesday, 14 May 2008:14.30-17.30

Answer THREE questions, at least TWO from SECTION B. Avoid overlap in your answers.

SECTION A

1. 'The Milesians can be regarded as genuinely rational enquirers.' Discuss.
2. Is Aristotle right to criticize Heraclitus for denying the principle of non-contradiction?
3. 'What is for saying and for thinking of must be; for it is for being, but nothing is not' (Parmenides, Fragment 6, lines 1-2). Discuss.
4. Does Anaxagoras make adequate use of *nous* as the cause of everything?
5. 'Aristotle's understanding of time and space shows how Zeno's paradoxes can be solved.' Discuss.

SECTION B

6. How plausible is Socrates' denial of weakness of will?
7. How, if at all, does the theory of recollection solve Meno's paradox of inquiry?
8. EITHER (a) Critically assess the *Phaedo*'s final argument for immortality.
OR (b) Are there good reasons to reject the *Republic*'s tripartition of the soul?

TURN OVER

9. Does *Republic V*'s explanation of the difference between knowledge and belief or opinion (*doxa*) commit Plato to the existence of two worlds?
10. How, if at all, does movement along the Divided Line of *Republic VI* represent intellectual progress?
11. Comment critically on the following passage:

Is it not true that equal stones and sticks sometimes, without changing in themselves, appear equal to one but not to another?

Certainly.

Well now, have you ever thought that the equals themselves were unequal, or that equality was inequality?

No, never, Socrates.

Then these equal things are not the same as equality itself. (Plato, *Phaedo* 74c)

12. 'Forms are set in nature like patterns, whereas other things resemble them and are likenesses ...' (*Parmenides* 132d1-3). Explain and assess Parmenides' argument against this proposal.
13. EITHER (a) 'Nothing is one thing itself by itself' (*Theaetetus* 152d2-3). How successfully does Socrates make the case for this proposition?

OR (b) In the *Theaetetus*, is Socrates right to say that he has failed to explain how false judgement is possible?
14. Does the *Sophist* distinguish different uses of the verb 'to be' (*einai*)? Would the recognition of different uses be important for Platonic metaphysics?
15. EITHER (a) If it is true today that there will be a sea battle tomorrow, is it already impossible to prevent the sea battle from happening?

OR (b) Evaluate Aristotle's argument that the eternal is necessary.
16. If nothing can come from nothing, how, according to Aristotle, can anything change?
17. Why does Aristotle think that knowledge is of what is necessary and universal? Is this requirement on knowledge too demanding?
18. Is Aristotle's teleology anthropocentric?

19. EITHER (a) Explain Aristotle's definition of the soul as the first actuality of a certain kind of body.

OR (b) Comment critically on the following passage:

A further difficulty concerns the affections of soul: are they all affections held in common with what possesses the soul, or is any of them peculiar to the soul itself? To determine this is indispensable but not easy. If we consider the majority of them, there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body; e.g. anger, feeling confident, appetite, and sensation generally. Thinking seems the most probable exception; but if this too proves to be a form of imagination or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence. If there is any way of acting or being acted upon proper to soul, it will be capable of separate existence. But if there is nothing peculiar to it, it will not be separable, but it will be like the straight to which, qua straight, many properties belong; for example that of touching a bronze sphere at a point, though the straight if separated will not touch it in this way; it cannot be so separated at all, since it is always found in a body. It therefore seems that all the affections of soul involve a body – anger, gentleness, fear, pity, confidence, joy, loving, and hating; in all these there is a concurrent affection of the body. (Aristotle, *De Anima* I.1, 403a3-19)

20. Explain and assess Aristotle's argument that primary substances are ontologically prior to secondary substances and to items in other categories.
21. Critically assess the role of the unmoved mover in Aristotle's account of change.

END OF PAPER