

**UNIVERSITY OF LONDON**

**088 0020**

**BA EXAMINATION 2008**

for Internal Students

This paper is also taken by Combined Studies Students

**PHILOSOPHY**

2. Epistemology and Methodology

**Friday, 9 May 2008:14.30-17.30**

Answer THREE questions. Avoid overlap in your answers. Questions beginning with \* may not be answered by students taking the Mind exam.

1. Can the notion of coherence be explained in such a way as to make it plausible that the coherence of a set of beliefs is a reason to think that some belief in the set is true?
2. Is knowledge analysable in non-epistemic terms?
3. 'Any sceptical argument must rely on some epistemic principle or other, and no epistemic principle could be more rationally secure than my belief that I have a hand. So no sceptical argument could rationally undermine my belief that I have a hand.' Discuss.
4. How, and how well, does a contextualist approach to either knowledge or justification meet the sceptical challenge of radical scepticism?
5. Can a foundationalist conception of epistemic justification be motivated without any appeal to some notion like certainty, or immunity to rational doubt? If so, how? If not, why not?
6. Assess the view that the primary objects of perceptual awareness are sense-data.
7. Does the theory that experiential states have intentional content help explain how perceptual knowledge is possible?

**TURN OVER**

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8. How, if at all, is *a priori* knowledge possible?
9. 'Remembering that *p* is a matter of preserving the knowledge that *p*. You cannot remember what you have never known to be the case.' Discuss.
10. 'When I remember some past event, I may imagine what then occurred, but imagery can only accompany the memory and cannot constitute it.' Are there any good reasons to endorse this claim?
11. 'If the belief that *p* is to be epistemically justified for *S*, then *S* must have a reason to believe that the method of acquiring the belief that *p* is at least reliable.' Discuss.
12. Does knowledge acquired through testimony rest on an inductive inference?
- \*13. In what sense, if any, does one have privileged access to one's own state of mind?
14. EITHER (a) Discuss the thesis of the structural identity of explanation and prediction.  
OR (b) Must an explanation of an event cite its causes?
15. Suppose a certain event was very unlikely. Does that make the actual occurrence of the event inexplicable?
16. Does the underdetermination of theory by evidence show that observation never justifies belief in the unobservable?
17. 'Both a black raven and a red herring confirm the claim that all ravens are black.' Discuss.
18. What is Goodman's new riddle of induction? What, if anything, does it show about the principle of the uniformity of nature?
19. EITHER (a) Can there be an inductive justification of induction?  
OR (b) Does Reichenbach's pragmatic justification of induction succeed?

**END OF PAPER**