

**BA EXAMINATION 2008**

for Internal Students

This paper is also taken by combined students

**PHILOSOPHY**

Optional subject (q): The Philosophies of Frege, Russell, and the early and late Wittgenstein

**Monday, 12 May 2008:10.00-13.00**

Answer THREE questions. Candidates must answer on at least TWO philosophers. (The early and late Wittgenstein count as two philosophers.) Avoid overlap in your answers.

**A. Frege**

1. Explain and assess Frege's view that thoughts are objective rather than subjective.
2. Is Frege consistent when he claims that the concept *horse* is not a concept?
3. Why, in the *Foundations of Arithmetic*, does Frege reject the contextual definition of number? Is his own definition more successful?
4. How tenable is Frege's view that sentences refer to truth values?

**B. Russell**

5. What were Russell's reasons for embracing logical atomism? Were they good reasons?
6. Why did Russell adopt the multiple relation theory of judgment? Was he correct to do so?
7. What is Russell's theory of descriptions? What logical and ontological problems is it designed to solve? Does it succeed?
8. What is Russell's distinction between 'knowledge by acquaintance' and 'knowledge by description'? Does he succeed in using this distinction to account for our knowledge of the external world?

**TURN OVER**

### **C. Early Wittgenstein**

9. In what sense, if any, are representations 'pictorial'?
10. Why, in the *Tractatus*, does Wittgenstein maintain that there must be simple objects?
11. 'There is a sense in which solipsism is true; what the solipsist *means* is quite correct, only it cannot be *said*, but makes itself manifest.' Discuss.
12. What, according to the *Tractatus*, accounts for the necessity of necessary propositions?

### **D. Late Wittgenstein**

13. What does Wittgenstein mean when he says that pain is 'not a something, but not a nothing either'? Is he correct?
14. Could there be a language that could in principle only be understood by one person?
15. 'This was our paradox. No course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule.' (Wittgenstein). What was the paradox? Does Wittgenstein solve it?
16. What does Wittgenstein mean in *On Certainty* by 'hinge propositions'? Do they provide the basis for a promising solution to sceptical worries?

**END OF PAPER**