

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

088 0180

BA EXAMINATION 2008

for Internal Students

This paper is also taken by Combined Studies Students

PHILOSOPHY

Optional subject (m): Indian Philosophy

Tuesday, 29 April 2008:10.00-13.00

Answer THREE questions. Avoid overlap in your answers.

1. EITHER (a) 'Perceptual knowledge is non-verbalized'. Assess this Naiyāyika claim and some of the responses from other Schools, e.g. Buddhism, Grammarians and Mīmāṃsā.

OR (b) How useful is the distinction between non-qualificative (*nirvikalpaka*) perception and propositional (*savikalpaka*) perception in either proving or rebutting the Buddhist claim that all perceptual judgment is non-veridical?
2. Does Dīrṅnāga's Theory of Exclusion (*apohavāda*) offer a satisfactory account of how a general term refers? In your answer evaluate Nyāya's realist objections.
3. EITHER (a) Does Nyāya succeed in refuting the Buddhist claim that wholes do not really exist because they are only inferred and because of the impenetrability principle?

OR (b) Does the Navya-Nyāya expedient of 'delimiters' (*avacchedakas*) in predication preserve their theory of whole and parts against the Buddhist objection that it violates the Law of Non-Contradiction?
4. Assess how effectively Udāyana's doctrine of 'impediments to generic properties' (*jātis*) helps defend Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's realism against Buddhist nominalism.
5. EITHER (a) Assess the arguments of the Grammarians on the existence and nature of substance (*dravya*).

OR (b) Since the Grammarians maintain that 'any nominalized expression can be said to refer to a substance' (Matilal), are they able to sustain a coherent account of what a substance (*dravya*) and a quality (*guṇa*) are?

6. Is the Naiyāyika justified in claiming that the Buddhist cannot logically prove his Momentariness Doctrine?
7. 'The snake you thought you saw was only a rope.' Which theory of error is better able to handle this example: the 'assertion of what is unreal' (*asatkhyāti*) theory of Buddhism or the 'assertion of what is otherwise' (*anyathākhyāti*) theory of Nyāya?
8. How successfully does Nāgārjuna's Emptiness Doctrine (*śūnyatā-vāda*) avoid the two extreme positions of annihilationism and eternalism?
9. Are the Buddhists right to view the phenomenal world as ultimately indeterminable in character and, consequent upon this view, to bifurcate truth?
10. Does the Indian logicians' distinction between nominally bound or choice negation (*paryudāsa*) and verbally bound or exclusion negation (*prasajya-pratishedha*) vindicate the Mādhyamika use of the tetralemma from the charge of illogicality?
11. How successfully does Vaiśeṣika defend its theory of substance as a distinct category of existence that is the bearer of properties? Consider objections from two of the following: Buddhism, Sāṃkhya and Advaita Vedānta.
12. Does Gaṅgeśa give a definition of veridical awareness (*praṃā*) that can withstand Śrīharṣa's attack upon Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's realism?
13. Is Vaiśeṣika's realist ontology able to survive Śrīharṣa's denial of distinctness (*bheda*) and relations? How successful is Gaṅgeśa's defence of inherence (*samavāya*)?
14. Assess whether the Jaina Theory of Viewpoints (*naṃavāda*) succeeds in offering an integrated and unified account of the world, e.g. of physical objects, selves etc.
15. How valid is the charge that the Jaina Doctrine of Conditional Affirmation (*syādvāda*) suffers from self-contradiction and uncertainty?
16. How successful is Sāṃkhya in eliminating the need for any explanatory role for God in its account of causation?

END OF PAPER