

**BA EXAMINATION 2008**

for Internal Students

This paper is also taken by Combined Studies Students

**PHILOSOPHY**

Optional subject (c): Philosophy of Mind

**Monday, 12 May 2008:14.30-17.30**

Answer THREE questions. Avoid overlap in your answers.

1. EITHER (a) Are pains objects?  
  
OR (b) What is the relation between the belief that one is in pain and being in pain?
2. Can the intentionality of mental states be accounted for in terms of the idea of a 'proper function'?
3. EITHER (a) 'Mary could know all the physical facts, but not know what it is like to see red. So physicalism is false.' Discuss.  
  
OR (b) 'Fundamentally, an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism.' Discuss.
4. Can an externalist about mental content adequately account for the explanation of action?
5. How, if at all, does our knowledge of what we ourselves do differ from our knowledge of what happens to us?
6. What is the problem of mental causation? Is there a satisfactory solution?
7. 'Knowledge of our own mental states is based either on observation, on inference, or on nothing.' Discuss.
8. Is the problem of self-deception resolved by positing a divided mind?
9. Can there be a non-reductive physicalism?
10. Is deciding to do something a way of trying to do it?

**TURN OVER**

11. Must our reasons for acting involve knowledge and not just belief?
12. 'All psychological explanation is rational explanation.' Discuss.
13. EITHER (a) Is intentionality the mark of the mental?  
  
OR (b) 'If I am thinking about Santa Claus, then there is something I am thinking about. But Santa Claus does not exist, so I am thinking about nothing.' Discuss.
14. What role, if any, does causation play in the individuation of action?
15. 'Functionalism is as unsatisfactory an account of thought as it is of action.'  
Discuss.

**END OF PAPER**