

BA EXAMINATION 2002

for Internal Students

This paper is also taken by Combined Studies Students

PHILOSOPHY

Optional subject (p): The Philosophies of Frege, Russell, and early and late Wittgenstein

Tuesday, 14 May 2002: 2.30 – 5.30

Answer THREE questions. Candidates must answer on at least TWO philosophers. (The early and late Wittgenstein count as two philosophers.) Candidates taking optional paper (r) Philosophy of Mathematics may NOT attempt question 3, marked by an asterisk. Avoid overlap in your answers.

1. Can Frege respect his own injunction never to lose sight of the distinction between concept and object?
2. EITHER (a) 'We can establish the reference of concrete singular terms by pointing, but the reference of abstract singular terms must be introduced contextually. So we cannot assume the same notion of reference for both kinds of terms.' How should a follower of Frege respond to this argument?

OR (b) 'If Frege's proofs are to show us that the truths of arithmetic are analytic, his definitions of the numbers must capture our ordinary understanding of the number words.' Discuss.
- *3. Why does Frege reject the contextual definition of number? Was he right to do so?
4. What reasons does Frege offer for the view that sentences refer to truth values? Is this view tenable?
5. 'Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of particulars with which we are acquainted.' Discuss.
6. Critically assess Russell's remark in 'On Denoting' that, by itself, the phrase 'a man' in 'I met a man' is destitute of meaning.
7. Expound Russell's 'multiple relations' theory of judgement. What light does it shed on the nature of truth?
8. EITHER (a) Explain and evaluate Russell's response to the traditional

problem of our knowledge of the external world.

- OR (b) 'Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities.' Does Russell offer us any successful logical constructions?

TURN OVER

9. In what way, if at all, is a proposition like a picture?
10. Why does Wittgenstein claim in the *Tractatus* that there must be logically simple objects? Was he right to do so?
11. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein writes: 'the limits of my language mean the limits of my world'. Explain and assess the idea that he expresses with this sentence.
12. What, according to the *Tractatus*, cannot be said, but only shown? Is this idea intelligible?
13. Does following a rule require a community? If so, in what way? If not, why not?
14. 'The private language argument simply relies on the assumption that speakers will not remember what they previously meant by an expression.' Discuss.
15. Does Wittgenstein's rejection of private mental objects require him to adopt a behaviourist stance towards mental states?
16. What does Wittgenstein mean in *On Certainty* by 'hinge propositions'? Do they form the basis for a promising solution to sceptical worries?

END OF PAPER