

# UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

## B A EXAMINATION

for Internal Students

This paper is also taken by Combined Studies Students

## PHILOSOPHY

Optional Subject (p): The Philosophies of Frege, Russell, and early and late Wittgenstein

Answer THREE questions. Candidates must answer Questions on at least TWO philosophers. (The early and late Wittgenstein count as two philosophers.)

1. Why would anyone think that deduction can give us no new knowledge? Is Frege's rejection of this view convincing?
2. Does Frege succeed in showing how one could introduce the notion of natural number to someone who had no previous understanding of the numerals?
3. Explain and evaluate Frege's view that thoughts are objective rather than subjective.
4. 'The concept *number* is not an object.' Why might it be thought that this proposition creates a problem for Frege?
5. What special problem does the expression 'I' pose for Frege's semantic framework? Is there an adequate Fregean solution to this problem?
6. Could Russell accept that all our knowledge is knowledge by description?

7. Why does Russell believe that there must be 'simples'? Is he justified?
8. What problems led Russell to develop type theory? Does Russell deal with these problems satisfactorily?
9. What reasons led Russell to his Multiple Relations Theory of Judgement? Is the theory cogent?
10. 'According to the *Tractatus* the nature of reality is there to be discovered in objects.' (David Pears) Discuss.
11. Expound and assess Wittgenstein's reason in the *Tractatus* for thinking that properties are analysable into concatenations of simple signs.
12. Wittgenstein tells us that the arrangements of elements in a proposition can picture a possible state of affairs. Can it really do this?
13. 'Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism.' (*Tractatus* 5.64) Discuss.
14. What work is the saying/showing distinction intended to do in the *Tractatus*? Can it do this?
15. Does Wittgenstein provide any convincing argument against the possibility of a private language?
16. Explain and evaluate Wittgenstein's view that understanding is not a mental process.
17. 'Contrary to what he says, Wittgenstein appears to believe that there is an essence

to language after all: language is essentially rule-governed.' Discuss.

18. EITHER (a) What does Wittgenstein think is the connection between an  
intention and an action in accord with it?

OR (b) 'To follow a rule is simply to act blindly.' Discuss.

19. 'To say of a man, in Moore's sense, that he knows something; that what he says is  
therefore unconditionally the truth, seems wrong to me. It is the truth only  
inasmuch as it is an unmovable foundation of his language-game.' (*On Certainty*,  
403.) Explain and evaluate the claim made here.

**END OF PAPER**