

**BA EXAMINATION 2002**

for Internal Students

This paper is also taken by Combined Studies Students

**PHILOSOPHY**

Greek Philosophy from the beginnings to Aristotle

Friday, 3 May 2002: 10.00 – 1.00

Answer THREE questions, at least TWO from SECTION B. Avoid overlap in your answers.

**SECTION A**

1. 'Heraclitus' account of the world is fundamentally inconsistent.' Discuss.
2. Explain and evaluate Parmenides' argument that 'what is' must be ungenerated and imperishable.
3. What does Anaxagoras mean by the claim that everything (except mind) is in everything? Can he account for the apparent differences between things?
4. Why and how did Zeno try to reduce the idea of place to absurdity?

**SECTION B**

5. Does Plato have a good solution to Meno's paradox of inquiry?
6. EITHER (a) 'If one does not allow Forms of things . . . and does not distinguish some single Form in each case, one will have nowhere to turn one's thoughts, since one is not allowing that in each case there is an Idea which is always the same, and so one will utterly remove the possibility of discourse' (*dialegesthai*) (Plato, *Parmenides* 135 b-c). Discuss.  
  
OR (b) What aspect of Plato's theory of Forms is the Third Man Argument intended to attack?
7. EITHER (a) When arguing for the distinction between reason and appetite (or desire – *epithumia*) in *Republic IV*, Plato refers to a possible objection, namely 'that no one has an appetite for drink but rather for good drink' (438a). Explain this objection. Does Plato have an adequate response to it?

- OR (b) Does Plato think that the only immortal part of the soul is reason? If so, why, if not, why not?

**TURN OVER**

8. Give a critical analysis of the following passage (*Republic* 479a-e):

Now that these points have been established, I want to address a question to our friend who doesn't believe in the beautiful itself or any form of the beautiful itself that remains always the same in all respects but who does believe in the many beautiful things – the lover of sights who wouldn't allow anyone to say that the beautiful itself is one or that the just is one or any of the rest: 'My dear fellow,' we'll say, 'of all the many beautiful things, is there one that will not also appear ugly? Or is there one of those just things that will not also appear unjust? Or one of those pious things that will not also appear impious?'

There isn't one, for it is necessary that they appear to be beautiful in a way and also to be ugly in a way, and the same with the other things you asked about.

What about the many doubles? Do they appear any the less halves than doubles?

Not one.

So, with the many large and small and light and heavy things, is any one of them any more the thing someone says it is than its opposite?

No, each of them always participates in both opposites.

Is it the case, then, that any one of the many any more is than is not what someone says it is?

No, they are ... ambiguous, and one cannot understand them as fixedly being or fixedly not being or as both or as neither.

Then do you know how to deal with them? Or can you find a more appropriate place to put them than intermediate between being and not being? Surely, they can't *be* more than what is or *not be* more than what is not, for apparently nothing is darker than what is not or clearer than what is.

Very true.

We've now discovered, it seems, that according to the many conventions of the majority of people about beauty and the others, they are rolling around as intermediates between what is not and what purely is.

We have.

9. Evaluate the reasons Socrates gives in the *Phaedo* for thinking that the arrangement of his bones and sinews is not an adequate explanation of why he is sitting in prison.

10. EITHER (a) Does Plato have an answer to the challenge of relativism, as it is represented by Protagoras in Plato's *Theaetetus*?

OR (b) Why, in the *Theaetetus*, does Plato reject 'true judgement with an account' as a definition of knowledge?

11. How successfully does Plato respond to the sophists' claim that we cannot speak of non-being, and that as a result contradiction is impossible?
12. What, according to Aristotle's *Physics*, is the relation between matter, form and nature? Why is it necessary for the student of nature to know about matter?
13. EITHER (a) Is the analogy Aristotle draws between the relationship of soul and body and the relationship between form and matter in an artefact misleading?  
  
OR (b) Describe and evaluate Aristotle's account of perception.

**TURN OVER**

14. Give a critical analysis of the following passage:

Clearly, therefore, not everything is or happens of necessity: some things happen as chance has it, and of the affirmation and the negation neither is true rather than the other; with other things it is one rather than the other and as a rule, but still it is possible for the other to happen instead.

What is, necessarily is, when it is; and what is not, necessarily is not, when it is not. But not everything that is, necessarily is; and not everything that is not, necessarily is not. For to say that everything that is, is of necessity, when it is, is not the same as saying unconditionally that it is of necessity. Similarly with what is not. And the same account holds true for contradictories: everything necessarily is or is not, and will be or will not be; but one cannot divide and say that one or the other is necessary. I mean, for example: it is necessary for there to be or not to be a sea-battle tomorrow; but it is not necessary for one to take place or not to take place. So, since statements are true according to how the actual things are, it is clear that wherever these are such as to allow of contraries as chance has it, the same necessarily holds for the contradictories also. (Aristotle, *On Interpretation* 19a19-33).

15. What does Aristotle mean by demonstrative knowledge? Evaluate his argument that not all knowledge is demonstrative.

16. EITHER (a) 'What, then, is to stop parts in nature too from being like this - the front teeth of necessity growing sharp and suitable for biting, and the back teeth broad and serviceable for chewing the food, not coming to be for this, but by coincidence?' Explain and evaluate Aristotle's answer to this question.

OR (b) Can Aristotle believe in teleology in natural phenomena without ascribing agency and intentionality to those phenomena?

17. Is Aristotle's derivation of time from change circular?

18. How, if at all, does the *Metaphysics* differ from the *Categories* in its answer to the question 'What is primary substance?'

19. Is Aristotle's god an efficient cause, a final cause, or both?

**END OF PAPER**