

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

BA EXAMINATION 2007

for Internal Students

This paper is also taken by Combined Studies Students

PHILOSOPHY

Optional subject (m): Indian Philosophy

Answer THREE questions. Avoid overlap in your answers.

1. Discuss and evaluate some of the arguments in the debate between the Grammarians, Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika over theories of how our use of words is able to denote particular objects.
2. Critically evaluate Vaiśeṣika's defence of its theory of substance as the bearer of properties against the sorts of objections that Buddhism, Sāṃkhya and Advaita Vedānta might raise.
3. Does Vaiśeṣika succeed in defending its account of the existence and nature of wholes and parts against Buddhist reductionist strategies?
4. Critically assess the Vaiśeṣika account of universals. Does the Buddhist theory of exclusion (*apohavāda*) succeed in explaining them away?
5. How well does Gaṅgeśa rebut Śrīharṣa's attack upon Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's realist account of veridical awareness (*praṃā*)?
6. Do Śrīharṣa's arguments against distinctness (*bheda*) and relations succeed in undermining Vaiśeṣika's realist ontology? How cogent is Gaṅgeśa's defence of inherence (*samavāya*)?
7. Does the Jaina Theory of Viewpoints (*nayavāda*) succeed in reconciling the positions of Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta regarding the existence and nature of the self (*ātman/puruṣa*)?
8. Is the Jaina Theory of Non-onesidedness (*anekāntavāda*), with its auxiliary Doctrine of Conditional Affirmation (*syādvāda*) and its method of Sevenfold Predication (*saptabhaṅgī*), able to refute the criticism that it is vitiated by self-contradiction (*virodha*) and uncertainty/doubt (*saṃśaya*)?

TURN OVER

9. Critically assess both the arguments in Sāṃkhya for the theory of causation that 'the effect exists in its cause' and the arguments against this theory in Nyāya.
10. Does the claim of the Mādhyamika Buddhist that 'all things are empty' amount to metaphysical nihilism? If not, how does it avoid this? If so, does this matter?
11. Do the arguments of Sāṃkhya and Nyāya for the existence of the self survive the onslaught of Buddhist objections?
12. Explain the role of invariable concomitance/pervasion (*vyāpti*) in the five-membered 'inference for another' of Nyāya, and assess whether the difficulties in establishing invariable concomitance/pervasion prevent 'inference' from being a valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

END OF PAPER