

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

BA EXAMINATION

for Internal Students

This paper is also taken by Combined Studies Students

PHILOSOPHY

Optional Subject (c): Philosophy of Mind

Answer THREE questions. Candidates taking Optional Paper (t), Philosophy of Psychology, may NOT attempt questions 12 or 14, marked with an asterisk.

1. What problems do the phenomena of consciousness pose for physicalist theories of mind?
2. 'Physicalism has as much difficulty explaining mental causation as does dualism'. Is this true?
3. Are mental states exhaustively characterised by their causal or functional roles?
4. EITHER (a) 'Pains cannot be identified with the firing of C-fibres because identity statements formed using rigid designators are necessary'. Discuss.

OR (b) 'I am my brain'. Discuss.
5. To what extent, if any, can our emotional responses be understood as rational?
6. EITHER (a) Is the thesis of externalism compatible with the claim that a person is authoritative about the contents of his or her own thoughts?

OR (b) 'Externalism is the view that states of mind depend for their identity on facts which are external to the subject's body. Therefore externalism shows that states of mind cannot be states of the brain'. Discuss.

7. How, if at all, is the causal history of an action relevant to whether the action was

performed for a reason?

8. EITHER (a) Is what I mean by 'red' private in a way that what I mean by 'round' is not?

OR (b) 'For all I know, how things look to you may be systematically different from how they look to me'. Discuss.

9. Does our capacity for first person reference depend on our being presented to ourselves in a certain way?

10. EITHER (a) What is the theory theory? Is it plausible?

OR (b) 'Simulation theory cannot account for our predictive mistakes'. Discuss.

11. Does perceptual experience have content which is non-conceptual? If so, is such content ineffable?

12.* What parallels, if any, exist between Davidson's explanation of action and Freud's explanation of a dream?

13. EITHER (a) What is intentionality? What philosophical problems does it present?

OR (b) 'Naturalistic accounts of content cannot account for misrepresentation'. Discuss.

14.* What is the language of thought hypothesis? Is it true?

15. Is action just behaviour?

END OF PAPER