

MA Ethics Background Reading List

Notes:

1. This general background reading list covers a wide range of topics; by no means all of these topics will be covered in the seminars. This reading list should be used in conjunction with the University of London Philosophy Study Guide, which covers reading for some other topics not mentioned here.
2. In addition to this reading list, you will be provided with a reading list specifically covering the seminar topics. As many of the topics covered in the seminars will overlap with the topics in this list, you should use these reading lists in tandem.
3. When you consider the reading for any topic, the items marked with an asterisk (*) should be treated as what you need to absorb if you are to get a reasonable grasp of the topic.
4. The questions after each topic's reading list are not a systematic selection from past papers: they are just suggestions of the sort of questions to think about during and after reading.
5. Any suggestions for improvements or additions to the reading list, or for further topics, please contact Peter Goldie by e-mail: peter.goldie@kcl.ac.uk.

Truth and objectivity

*Plato Euthyphro.

*Ayer A.J. (1936) *Language, Truth and Logic*. London: Penguin. Chapter 6: A Critique of Ethics and Theology@.

*Harman G. (1977) *The Nature of Morality*. New York: OUP. Chapter 1.

*Mackie J.L. (1977) *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*. London: Penguin. Chapter 1. Also in Sayre-McCord G., ed., *Essays on Moral Realism*.

*Hare R.M. (1981) *Moral Thinking*. Oxford: Clarendon. Chapter 4.

*Nagel T. (1986) *The View From Nowhere*. Oxford: OUP. Chapter VIII: '1, A Realism and Objectivity@, and '2, A Anti-Realism@.

*McDowell J. (1985) *A Values and Secondary Qualities@*, in *Morality and Objectivity: a Tribute to J.L. Mackie*, London: Routledge, pages 110-129.

Stevenson C.L. (1944) *Ethics and Language*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Chapter 1.

Gibbard A. *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings*. Oxford: Clarendon. Part III.

Wiggins D. (1987) *A Truth as Predicated of Moral Judgements@*, Essay IV in his *Needs, Values, Truth*. Oxford: Blackwell. Up to the end of '12.

Wright C. (1986) *A Truth in Ethics@*, in *Truth in Ethics*, Hooker B., ed, Oxford: Blackwell, pages 1-18.

Williams B.A.O. (1986) *A Truth in Ethics@*, in *Truth in Ethics*, Hooker B., ed, Oxford: Blackwell, pages 19-34.

Nagel T. (1997) *The Last Word*. OUP. Especially read Chapters 1,2, and 6.

Questions:

1. Are there moral facts? Of what kind would they be?
2. A Moral principles cannot be justified by their role in explaining moral observations; scientific principles can.@ Discuss.
3. A There are no objective values.@ Discuss.

More, particularly on projection and secondary qualities:

Hume D. *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon. Book II, Part III, 'III; Book III, Part I; Part III, 'I and 'III.

Hume D. *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon. '1 and Appendix I.

Hume D. *AA Standard Of Taste@*, in his *Essays: Moral, Political and Literary*.

Wiggins D. (1987) *AA Sensible Subjectivism@*, Essay V in his *Needs, Values, Truth*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Williams B.A.O. (1995) *A Ethics and the Fabric of the World@*, reprinted in his *Making Sense of Humanity*, Cambridge: CUP, pages 172-181.

McDowell J. (1983) *AAesthetic value, objectivity, and the fabric of the world@*, in *Pleasure, Preference and Value*, E. Schaper ed., Cambridge: CUP, pages 1-16.

McDowell J. (1988) *A Projection and Truth in Ethics@*, Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas.

Blackburn S. (1984) *Spreading the Word*. Oxford: Clarendon. Chapter 6.

Blackburn S. (1988) *A How to be an ethical anti-realist@*, *Midwest Studies Vol XII*, reprinted in his *Essays in Quasi-Realism*, Oxford: OUP, 1993.

Blackburn S. (1995) *A The Flight to Reality@*, in *Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory*, eds Hursthouse, Lawrence and Quinn, Oxford: Clarendon, 1995.

Questions:

1. Are there any useful analogies to be drawn between values and secondary qualities?
2. What is a *A projectivist@* theory of moral judgement? How would you assess such a view?
3. Are values part of the fabric of the world, or are they projected by us on to the world?

Impartiality: equal respect and universalisability

*Kant I., *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, translated by Paton H.J. Chapters I and II.

*Nagel T. (1986) *The View From Nowhere*. Oxford: OUP. Chapter VIII "3-6, and Chapter IX.

*Hare R.M. (1981) *Moral Thinking*. Oxford: Clarendon. Chapters 5 and 6.

*Winch D. (1965) *A The Universalisability of Moral Judgements@*, *Monist* 1965, reprinted in his *Ethics and Action*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1972.

*Wiggins D. (1987) *Needs, Values, Truth*. Oxford: Blackwell. Essay II and Essay IV, '13 to the end.

*Korsgaard C. (1989) *A Kant=s Formula of Humanity@*, in her *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*, Cambridge: CUP, 1996, as Chapter 4.

Kant I., *Metaphysics of Morals*, pages 375-413 of Berlin Academy Edition.

Korsgaard C. (1993) *A The Reasons We Can Share@*, *Social Philosophy and Policy* vol 10:1, reprinted in her *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*, Cambridge: CUP, 1996, as Chapter 10.

O=Neill O. (1989) *Constructions of Reason*. Cambridge: CUP. Chapter 5: *A Consistency in Action@*.

Mackie J.L. (1977) *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*. London: Penguin. Chapter 4.

Locke D. (1981) *A The Principle of Equal Interests@*, *Philosophical Review* 90, pages 531-559. Read up to page 549.

Williams B.A.O. (1985) *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*. London: Fontana. Pages 82-92 and 124-125.

Questions:

1. What does it mean, if anything, to treat someone as an end in themselves?
2. From the moral point of view persons are equal. Is there any way of understanding this claim such that it is true?
3. In what sense, if any, are moral reasons impartial?
4. What place, if any, should the Golden Rule play in ethical thinking?

Impartiality: the utilitarian approach to distributive justice

*Mill J.S., Utilitarianism, in Warnock ed., Chapter V.

*Smart J.J.C. and Williams B.A.O. (1973) Utilitarianism For and Against. Cambridge: CUP. Read Williams '7.

*Rawls J. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: OUP. Chapter 1: Justice as Fairness.

*Nozick R. (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell. Pages 26-33. Reprinted as Side-Constraints in Consequentialism and its Critics, Scheffler S., ed., Oxford, 1988, pages 134-141.

*Griffin J. (1986) Well-Being. Oxford: Clarendon. Pages 150-155, and pages 167-170.

*Kymlicka W. (1990) Contemporary Political Philosophy: an Introduction. Oxford: OUP. Chapter 2, pages 30-47.

Sidgwick H. (1907/1981) The Methods of Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett. Book III, Chapter V.

Scanlon T.M. (1988) Rights, Goals and Fairness, in Consequentialism and its Critics, Scheffler S., ed., Oxford: OUP, 1988, pages 74-92.

Sen A. (1988) Rights and Agency, in Consequentialism and its Critics, Scheffler S., ed., Oxford: OUP, 1988, pages 187-223.

Scanlon T. (1982) Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in Utilitarianism and Beyond, edited by Sen and Williams, CUP.

Scanlon T. (1998) What we Owe to Each Other. Harvard. Especially Chapter 3 and Part II.

Questions:

1. Should a government take decisions as to who gets what on utilitarian grounds even if it might be undesirable or psychologically impossible (or both) for its citizens to do so in their private lives?
2. Is it a sound criticism of utilitarianism that it ignores the separateness of persons?
3. Utilitarianism is not the best way of treating people as equal. Discuss.

Ethical relativism

*Williams B. (1972) Morality. Cambridge: CUP. Pages 17-27. Reprinted in Meiland J.W. and Krausz M., eds., Relativism, Cognitive and Moral.

*Harman G. (1975) Moral Relativism Defended, Philosophical Review 84, pages 3-22, reprinted in Meiland J.W. and Krausz M., eds., Relativism, Cognitive and Moral, Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982.

*Foot P. (1979) Moral Relativism, Lindley Lecture, reprinted in Meiland J.W. and Krausz M., eds., Relativism, Cognitive and Moral.

*Foot P. (1970) Morality and Art, Proceedings of the British Academy 56, pages 131-144, reprinted in Philosophy as it is, Burnyeat and Honderich eds., London: Penguin, 1978.

- *Williams B.A.O. (1981) *The Truth in Relativism*, in his *Moral Luck*. Cambridge: CUP. Reprinted in Meiland J.W. and Krausz M., eds., *Relativism, Cognitive and Moral*.
- *Wiggins D. (1990) *Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Moral Beliefs*, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91, pages 61-85.
- Davidson D. (1974) *On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme*, in his *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, Oxford: OUP, pages 183-198.
- Williams B.A.O. (1985) *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*. London: Fontana. Chapter 9.
- Altham J. (1995) *Reflection and Confidence*, in *World Mind and Ethics*, Altham J., and Harrison R., eds. Cambridge: CUP, 1995. Also read Williams= reply.

Questions:

1. Is there any reason why it might not be possible to formulate a credible version of ethical relativism?
2. Can the ethical objectivist escape from moral relativism?
3. *When in Rome, do as the Romans do.* Does this maxim hold so far as ethical practice is concerned?

Self-interest, altruism, and Hume=s artificial virtues

- *Plato Republic Book II, esp. " 357-367.
- *Williams B.A.O. (1972) *Morality: An Introduction to Ethics*. Cambridge: CUP. Chapter 1: *The Amoralist*.
- *Mackie J. (1977) *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*. London: Penguin. Pages 115-120.
- *Parfitt D. (1984) *Reasons and Persons*. Oxford: Clarendon. Chapter 2, " 23-24.
- Butler J. (*Bishop Butler*) (1726) *Fifteen Sermons*. Sermons 5, 11 and 12.
- *Hume D. *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon. Book III Part II, " I, II and V.
- *Hume D. *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon. 'III and 'V, and Appendices II and III.
- *Wiggins D. (1996) *Natural and Artificial Virtues: A Vindication of Hume=s Scheme*, in *How Should One Live?*, Crisp R., ed., Oxford: Clarendon, 1996, pages 131-140.
- *Williams B.A.O. (1973) *Egoism and Altruism*, in his *Problems of the Self*, Cambridge: CUP, 1973.
- Baier A. (1991) *A Progress of Sentiments*. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Chapters 7 and 8.
- Wiggins D. (1987) *A Sensible Subjectivism*, Essay V in his *Needs, Values, Truth*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Carroll L. (1895) *What the Tortoise Said to Achilles*, *Mind* 1895. Reprinted in *Mind* 1995, Vol 104.
- Blackburn S. (1995) *Practical Tortoise Raising*, *Mind*, Vol 104.
- Blackburn S. (1998) *Ruling Passions*. Clarendon Press. Especially Chapters 5 and 6.
- Gauthier D. (1986) *Morals by Agreement*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Ridley M. (1996) *The Origins of Virtue*. London: Penguin.

Questions:

1. Why should an individual act morally?
2. *Even the altruist does what he wants to do.* Does this mean that altruism collapses into egoism?
3. Is it possible for a person rationally to act against his own best interests?

4. What relevance, if any, does Hume's account of the artificial virtues have to the problem of the prisoner's dilemma?

Ethical Motivation: motivational internalism and internalism about reasons

*Hume D. *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed., L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford: Clarendon. Book II, Part III, 'III.

*Nagel T. (1970) *The Possibility of Altruism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters I and II.

*Williams B.A.O. (1980) *Internal and External Reasons* @, in his *Moral Luck*, Cambridge: CUP, 1981, pages 101-113.

*Korsgaard C. (1986) *Skepticism About Practical Reasoning* @ *Journal of Philosophy* 83, pages 5-25, reprinted in her *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*, Cambridge: CUP, 1996 as Chapter 11.

Korsgaard C. (1997) *The Normativity of Practical Reason* @, Chapter 8 in *Ethics and Practical Reason*, edited by Cullity G. and Gaut B. Oxford: Clarendon.

Foot P. (1972) *Reasons for Action and Desire* @, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, suppl. vol. 46, pages 189-201.

McDowell J. (1995) *Might there be external reasons?* @, in *World, Mind and Ethics*, eds. Altham J. and Harrison R., Cambridge: CUP, 1995, and Williams' reply.

Parfit, D. (1997) *Reasons and motivation* @, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, suppl. Vol. 71, pages 99-130.

Scanlon T. (1998) *What we Owe to Each Other*. Harvard. Especially Chapter 1 and the Appendix.

Velleman D. (2000) *The Possibility of Practical Reason*, OUP.

Dancy, J. (2000) *Practical Reality*. Oxford: OUP.

Questions:

1. What is implied in a statement of the form *AA has a moral reason to do X* @?

2. If internalism about reasons is true, then morality cannot be objectively binding on all rational agents. @ Discuss.

3. Does motivational externalism weaken the authority of morality?

Duty and the Categorical Imperative

*Kant I. *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, translated by Paton H.J. Chapters I and II.

*Hume D. *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed., L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford: Clarendon. Book III, Part II, 'I.

*Korsgaard C. (1989) *Kant's Analysis of Obligation: The Argument of Groundwork I* @, *Monist* 72:3, pages 311-340, reprinted in her *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*, Cambridge: CUP, 1996 as Chapter 3.

*Foot P. (1972) *Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives* @, *Philosophical Review* 81, pages 305-316.

*McDowell J. (1978) *Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?* @ *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* suppl. vol. 52, pages 13-29.

*Nagel T. (1970) *The Possibility of Altruism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters III-V.

Platts M. (1979) *Ways of Meaning*. London: Routledge. Chapter 10.

Prichard H.A. (1912) *Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?* @, *Mind* 21, pages 21-37, reprinted in Urmson J., ed., *Moral Obligation*. Oxford, 1968.

Wiggins D. (1991) *Categorical Requirements: Kant and Hume on the Idea of Duty*, *The Monist* Vol 74:1, reprinted in *Virtue and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory*, Hursthouse, Lawrence and

Quinn eds., Oxford: Clarendon, 1995, pages 297-330.

Questions:

1. What might a categorical moral demand be? Could there be such a thing?
2. AI know that it=s my moral duty to do X. But I have no desire to do X. So I won=t do X.@ Assess this piece of practical reasoning.
3. ADuty is an outmoded concept, and there is no place for it in today=s ethics.@ Discuss.

Moral conflicts, moral problems, and moral dilemmas

*Kant I. The Metaphysics of Morals. Pages 217-225. Reprinted in Gowans C., ed., Moral Dilemmas, New York: OUP, 1987.

*Mill J.S. Utilitarianism, Chapter V, paragraphs 26-end. Reprinted in Gowans C., ed., Moral Dilemmas.

*Mill J.S. A System of Logic, Book 6, Chapter 12, Section 7. Reprinted in Gowans C., ed., Moral Dilemmas.

*Sartre J.-P. (1948) Existentialism and Humanism, London: Methuen, translated by Mairet P.

*Hare R.M. (1981) Moral Thinking. Oxford: Clarendon. Chapter 2.

*Williams B.A.O. (1965) AEthical Consistency@, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. Vol 39, pages 103-124. Reprinted in his Problems of the Self, Cambridge: CUP, pages 166-186, and in Gowans C., ed., Moral Dilemmas, pages 115-137.

Stocker M. (1990) AMoral Conflicts: What they are and what they show@, in his Plural and Conflicting Values. Oxford: Clarendon as Chapter 4.

Stocker M. (1990) AMoral Dilemmas@, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 50.

Barcan Marcus R. (1980) AMoral Dilemmas and Consistency@, Journal of Philosophy 77, pages 121-136. Reprinted in Gowans C., ed., Moral Dilemmas, pages 188-204.

Foot P. (1983) AMoral Realism and Moral Dilemma@, Journal of Philosophy 80, pages 379-398. Reprinted in Gowans C., ed., Moral Dilemmas, pages 250-270.

Sullivan R.J. (1989) Immanuel Kant=s Moral Theory. Cambridge. Pages 72-75.

Chang R., ed. (1997) Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. A useful collection of papers.

Questions:

1. Could it be that there are two actions which you ought to do, in circumstances where it is not possible for you to do both actions?
2. Is it ever rational, or appropriate, to feel regret when you have done the action which is the best all things considered?
3. What is the difference, if any, between a moral problem and a moral dilemma?

Aristotle: the good for man and the virtues

*Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics. Book I; Book II; Book X, Chapters 6-9.

*Anscombe E. (1958) AModern Moral Philosophy@, Philosophy 33, pages 1-19. Also in her Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol III, Oxford: Blackwell, 1981.

Foot P. (2001) Natural Goodness. Oxford: Clarendon.

Hursthouse R. (1999) On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: OUP.

- *McDowell J. (1979) *A Virtue and Reason*, *The Monist* 62, pages 331-350.
- *Hume D. *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed., L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford: Clarendon. Appendix IV: *Of Some Verbal Disputes*.
- *Wiggins D. (1976) *Deliberation and Practical Reason*, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 76, pages 29-51, reprinted in Rorty A., ed., (1980) *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, California: University of California Press, pages 221-240, and in Wiggins *Needs, Values, Truth*.
- *Williams B.A.O. (1985) *What Does Intuitionism Imply?*, in his *Making Sense of Humanity*, Cambridge: CUP, 1995, as Chapter 15.
- McDowell J. (1995) *Two Sorts of Naturalism*, in *Virtue and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory*, Hursthouse, Lawrence and Quinn eds., Oxford: Clarendon, 1995, pages 149-179.
- Blum L. (1994) *Moral Perception and Particularity* in his *Moral Perception and Particularity*, Cambridge: CUP, as Chapter 3, pages 30-61.
- Foot P. (1978) *Virtues and Vices*, in her *Virtues and Vices*, Oxford: Blackwell. And the other papers too.
- MacIntyre A. (1981) *After Virtue: a study in moral theory*. London: Duckworth. Especially from Chapter 10 onwards.
- Slote M. (1983) *Good and Virtues*. Oxford: Clarendon. Chapter 2.
- Sherman M. (1997) *Making a Necessity of Virtue*. CUP. Especially Chapter 2.
- Hutchinson D. (1986) *The Virtues of Aristotle*. London: Routledge. A helpful book.

On Eudaimonia:

- In Rorty A., ed., (1980), *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*:
- Essay 1: Nagel T. *Aristotle on Eudaimonia*.
- Essay 2: Ackrill J.L. *Aristotle on Eudaimonia*.
- Essay 18: Wilkes K.V. *The Good Man and the Good for Man in Aristotle's Ethics*.
- *Essay 19: McDowell J. *The Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics*.
- Essay 20: Rorty A. *The Place of Contemplation in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*.
- Urmson J.O. (1988) *Aristotle's Ethics*. Oxford: Blackwell. Chapter 1.
- Kenny A. *Happiness*, in Barnes, Schofield and Sorabji eds., *Articles on Aristotle*.
- Heinaman R. (1988) *Eudaimonia and Self-sufficiency in the Nicomachean Ethics*, *Phronesis* 33, pages 31-53.
- Cooper J. (1986) *Reason and Human Good in Aristotle*. Indianapolis: Hackett. Section III.
- Cooper J. (1987) *Contemplation and Happiness: a Reconsideration*, *Synthese* 72, pages 187-216.
- Williams B.A.O. (1985) *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*. London: Fontana. Chapter 3: *Foundations: Well-Being*.
- Nussbaum M. (1995) *Aristotle on human nature and the foundations of ethics*, in *World, Mind and Ethics*, eds Altham and Harrison, Cambridge: CUP, 1995.
- Korsgaard C. (1986) *Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value*, *Ethics* 96:3, pages 486-505, reprinted in her *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*, Cambridge: CUP, 1996 as Chapter 8.
- Broadie S. (1991) *Ethics With Aristotle*. Oxford: OUP. Chapter 1.
- Hardie J. (1968) *Aristotle's Ethical Theory*. Oxford: Clarendon. Chapter II.
- Austin J.L. (1967) *Agathon and Eudaimonia in the Ethics of Aristotle*, in *Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays*, Moravcsik J. ed., New York: Doubleday, reprinted in *Austin's Philosophical Papers*,

Oxford: OUP, 1961.

Russell B. The Problems of Philosophy. Chapter 15: AThe Value of Philosophy@

Questions:

1. What is a virtue, and why are the virtues important to ethics?
2. AThe judgement lies with perception.@ (Aristotle) Is this still a useful thing to say in moral matters?
3. In what sense, if any, does Aristotle=s ethics aim to be naturalistic? Does it succeed in its aim?
4. What, for Aristotle, constitutes eudaimonia?
5. Can I, through deliberation, change what constitutes the good life for me?

Free will, character and responsibility

Collections:

Watson G., ed. (1982) Free Will. Oxford: OUP.

Rorty A., ed. (1969) The Identities of Persons. California: University of California Press.

Fischer J.M. and Ravizza M., eds. (1993) Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Flanagan O. and Rorty A., eds. (1993) Identity, Character, and Morality. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

Schoeman F., ed. (1987) Responsibility, Character and the Emotions. Cambridge: CUP.

On issues of responsibility:

*Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics Book III, Chapters 1-5.

*Frankfurt H. (1971) AFreedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person@, Journal of Philosophy 68, pages 5-20, reprinted in Watson G., ed. (1982).

*Strawson P., AFreedom and Resentment@, in his book of the same title; also in Watson G., ed., (1982) and in Fischer and Ravizza eds (1993).

*Adams R.M. (1985) AInvoluntary Sins@, Philosophical Review.

Taylor C. (1969) AResponsibility for Self@, in Watson G., ed., (1982), and in Rorty A., ed. (1976).

Williams B.A.O. (1987) AVoluntary acts and responsible agents@, in his Making Sense of Humanity, Cambridge: CUP, 1995.

Nagel T. (1986) The View From Nowhere. New York: OUP. Chapter VII, " 1-4.

Nagel T. (1979) AMoral Luck@, in his collection Mortal Questions Cambridge: CUP.

Williams B.A.O. (1976) AMoral Luck@, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supp vol L, reprinted in his collection Moral Luck, Cambridge: CUP, 1981.

Sherman N. (1989) The Fabric of Character. Oxford: Clarendon. Chapter 3: AThe Choices of a Character@.

On the traditional problem of free will:

*Kant I. Critique of Pure Reason, the Third Antimony, A445/B473 ff; pages 409 ff of the N. Kemp-Smith translation, Macmillan, 1929.

*Nietzsche F. Twilight of the Idols: AThe Four Great Errors@; Beyond Good and Evil, "9-23. Gay Science, '345, '347. Human, All Too Human, "18, 39, 70, 99, 105-107, 133-135. Daybreak, "115-131. Genealogy of Morals, Essay 1, '13.

Wiggins D. (1973) ATowards a Reasonable Libertarianism@, in Essays on Freedom of Action, ed.

Honderich T., London: Routledge, and reprinted in his *Needs, Values, Truth*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1987.
 Williams B.A.O. (1985) *How free does the will need to be?*, Lindley Lecture, reprinted as Chapter 1 of his *Making Sense of Humanity*, Cambridge: CUP, 1995.
 Kant I. *Critique of Practical Reason*. Translated by Lewis White Beck, New York: Macmillan, 1956.
 Allison H. (1990) *Kant's Theory of Freedom*. Cambridge: CUP. Part I.
 Flanagan, O. (1996) *Self Expressions: Mind, Morals and the Meaning of Life*. New York: OUP.

Questions:

1. To what extent, if any, are we responsible for our own character?
2. Are people sometimes morally responsible for what they do?
3. In what way, if any, is it possible to disentangle the question of responsibility for character from the traditional question of free will?
4. *Emotions are feelings. Feelings are passive. At most, I could only be responsible for what I (actively) do. So I cannot be responsible for my emotions.* Discuss.

The Doctrine of Double Effect, and Acts and Omissions

*Davidson D. (1971) *Agency*, in his *Actions and Events*, Oxford: OUP, 1980, pages 43-61.
 *Foot P. (1967) *The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect*, in *Oxford Review* 5, reprinted in her *Virtues and Vices*, Oxford: Blackwell 1978, pages 19-32.
 *Kenny A. (1995) *Philippa Foot on Double Effect*, in *Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory*, eds. Hursthouse R., Lawrence G and Quinn W., Oxford: Clarendon, 1995.
 *Austin J. (1961) *Three Ways of Spilling Ink*, in his *Philosophical Papers*, Oxford: Clarendon, pages 427-440.
 *Glover J. (1977) *Causing Deaths and Saving Lives*. London: Penguin. Chapters 6 and 7.
 Williams B.A.O. *Acts and omissions, doing and not doing* in his *Making Sense of Humanity*, Cambridge: CUP, 1995.
 Nagel T. (1986) *The View from Nowhere*. New York: OUP. Chapter 9.
 Mackie J. (1977) *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*. London: Penguin. Chapter 7, Section 6.
 Singer P. (1979) *Practical Ethics*. Cambridge: CUP. Chapters 7 and 8.
 Rachels J. (1979) *Killing and Starving to Death*, *Philosophy*.
 Dworkin, Nagel, Nozick, Rawls, Scanlon, and Jarvis Thomson, *Assisted Suicide: the Philosopher's Brief*, *New York Review of Books*, March 27, 1997.
 Kamm F. *Morality, Mortality, Vol II*, Chapters 1-5.

Questions:

1. Am I as morally responsible for my omissions as I am for my actions?
2. Is there a moral difference between intending to kill someone and intending to do something a known probable consequence of which is that that person will die?
3. What should be the role of our moral intuitions in formulating moral theory?

Weakness of the Will

*Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I, Chapter 13; Book II, Chapter 4; Book III, Chapter 2 and Chapters 10-12; Book VI, Chapter 2; Book VII, Chapters 1-10.

- *Austin J. (1961) AA Plea for Excuses@, in his Philosophical Papers, Oxford: Clarendon, pages 123-152.
- *Burnyeat M. (1980) AAristotle on Learning to be Good@, in Rorty A., ed., (1980) Essays on Aristotle=s Ethics, California: University of California Press, pages 69-92.
- *Wiggins D. (1987) AWeakness of Will, Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire@, Essay VII in his Needs, Values, Truth. Also in Rorty A., ed., (1980).
- *Davidson D. (1970) AHow is Weakness of the Will Possible?@, in his Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: OUP, 1980.
- *Hare R.M. (1981) Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Clarendon. Section 5: ABacksliding@.
- McDowell J. (1979) AVirtue and Reason@, The Monist 62, pages 331-350.
- Davidson D. (1982) AParadoxes of Irrationality@, in Philosophical Essays on Freud, eds., Wollheim R., and Hopkins J., Cambridge: CUP, pages 289-305.
- Stocker M. (1990) AAkrasia: The Unity of the Good, Commensurability, and Comparability@, in his Plural and Conflicting Values, Oxford: Clarendon as Chapter 7.
- Broadie S. (1991) Ethics With Aristotle. Oxford: OUP. Chapter 5: AIncontinence@.
- Charlton W. (1988) Weakness of the Will: A Philosophical Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell. A very useful book: read what you find relevant to your interest.
- Pears D. (1984) Motivated Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon.

Questions:

1. AThinking that weakness of the will presents a conceptual problem reveals an unduly optimistic view of human rationality.@ Discuss.
2. Is weakness of the will a problem in philosophy of mind or in ethics, or in both?
3. AA least the weak-willed person has the right motivations, even if he or she does not act according to those motivations.@ Discuss.

Utilitarianism: happiness; pleasure and pain; and desire

- *Mill J.S., Utilitarianism. Chapters III and IV.
- *Moore G.E.,(1903) Principia Ethica. Cambridge: CUP. Chapter III, "36-46.
- *Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics. Book VII, Chapters 11-14; Book X, Chapters 1-5. See also Aristotle and the related reading on eudaimonia.
- *Hare R.M.,(1963) Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Clarendon. '7.5 on happiness.
- *Kenny A. (1984) Action, Emotion and Will. Bristol: Thoemmes Press. Chapter VI: APleasure@.
- *Smart J.J.C. and Williams B.A.O. (1973) Utilitarianism For and Against. Cambridge: CUP. Read Smart, '3.
- *Griffin J. (1986) Well-Being. Oxford: OUP. Chapter 1.
- Skorupski J. (1989) John Stuart Mill. London: Routledge. Chapter 9, "1-6.
- McCloskey H.J. (1971) John Stuart Mill: A Critical Study. London: Macmillan. pages 70 to 72: AHappiness as Distinct from Pleasure@.
- Sidgwick H. (1907/1981) The Methods of Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett. Book I, Chapter IV.
- Austin Jean, APleasure and Happiness@, Philosophy 63, 1968. Reprinted in Schneewind J.B. ed., Mill, London: Macmillan, 1968, pages 234-250.

Questions:

1. Mill seems to claim that desiring something and finding it pleasant are equivalent. How does he support this claim? Is it true?
2. Is it true, as Mill claims, that we only desire happiness? What difference would it make to the claim if happiness and pleasure/absence of pain were distinguished?
3. What information would you need in order to determine how happy another person is?

Utilitarianism: Higher and lower pleasures

- *Mill J.S., Utilitarianism. Chapter 2, up to page 262.
- *Mill J.S. Bentham. Pages 99-105 in the Warnock Edition.
- *Moore G.E. (1903) Principia Ethica. Cambridge: CUP. Chapter III, "47-49.
- *Wollheim R. (1984) The Thread of Life. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Pages 221-224.
- Skorupski J. (1989) John Stuart Mill. London: Routledge. Chapter 9, '7.
- McCloskey H.J (1971) John Stuart Mill: A Critical Study. London: Macmillan. Pages 64 to 69.
- Sidgwick H. (1907/1981) The Methods of Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett. Book II, Chapters II and III.
- Griffin J. (1986) Well-Being. Oxford: OUP. Chapter II.
- Smart J.J.C. and Williams B. (1973) Utilitarianism For and Against. Cambridge: CUP. Smart '3.
- Norman R. (1983) The Moral Philosophers. Oxford: Clarendon. Chapter 7, pages 127-131.
- Quinton A. (1973) Utilitarian Ethics. London: Macmillan. Pages 38-47.
- Kymlicka W. (1990) Contemporary Political Philosophy: an Introduction. Oxford: OUP. Chapter 2, Section 2, pages 12-18.
- Scarre G. (1996) Utilitarianism. London: Routledge. Chapter IV, '4.

Questions:

1. What is the role of incompetent judges in distinguishing higher and lower pleasures? Why should there be an appeal against their verdict?
2. Is Mill's distinction between higher and lower pleasures qualitative or quantitative? If it is qualitative, does this undermine the credibility of utilitarianism?
3. Is Mill's conception of well-being hopelessly simplistic?

The Naturalistic Fallacy and Mill's Proof of the Principle of Utility

- *Mill J.S., Utilitarianism, esp. Chapter IV, and page 319 in the Warnock edition, including the first paragraph of the footnote.
- *Mill J.S., A System of Logic, Book VI, Chapter 12.
- *Moore G.E. (1903) Principia Ethica. Cambridge: CUP. Chapter III A, "39-44.
- *Frankena W.K. (1939) The Naturalistic Fallacy, Mind 48, pages 464-477. Reprinted in Theories of Ethics, Foot P., ed., Oxford: OUP, 1967, pages 50-63.
- Sidgwick H. (1907/1981) The Methods of Ethics Indianapolis: Hackett. Book IV, Chapter II.
- Skorupski J. (1989) John Stuart Mill. London: Routledge. Chapter 9, '2.
- Hare R.M. (1952) The Language of Morals. Oxford: Clarendon. Chapter 5, "1-5 and '8.
- Quinton A. (1973) Utilitarian Ethics. London: Macmillan. Chapter III, '(iv).
- Scarre G. (1996) Utilitarianism. London: Routledge. Chapter IV, '5.
- Hall E.W., The Proof of Utility in Bentham and Mill, in Mill, Schneewind J.B., ed., pages 145-

178.

Griffin J. (1986) *Well-being*. Oxford: Clarendon. Chapter VIII, '4, from page 147 (last paragraph).

Mackie J.L. (1977) *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*. London: Penguin. Chapter 6, '5.

Questions:

1. What is the structure of Mill's Aproof@? How would you criticise it?

2. What is the naturalistic fallacy? Is it a fallacy? Is Mill guilty of committing it in his Aproof@?

Forms of Utilitarianism

*Mill J.S., *Utilitarianism*. Chapter II, from page 268 of the Warnock edition. Chapter V, especially pages 303-304 and 316-end of the Warnock edition.

*Mill J.S., *Bentham*, pages 118-122 in the Warnock Edition.

*Hare R.M. (1981) *Moral Thinking*. Oxford: Clarendon. Chapter 2, "2.4-2.6.

*Smart J.J.C. and Williams B.A.O. (1973) *Utilitarianism For and Against*. Cambridge: CUP. Smart, "2 and 7; Williams "1 and 6.

Urmson J.O. (1953) *The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J.S. Mill*, *Philosophical Quarterly* 3, pages 33-39, reprinted in *Theories of Ethics*, Foot P., ed., Oxford: OUP, pages 128-136.

Williams B.A.O. (1972) *Morality: An Introduction to Ethics*. Cambridge: CUP. Pages 104-112.

Williams B.A.O. (1985) *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*. London: Fontana. Pages 105-109.

Kymlicka W. (1990) *Contemporary Political Philosophy: an Introduction*. Oxford: OUP. Chapter 2, pages 27-30.

Sidgwick H.(1907/1981) *The Methods of Ethics*. Indianapolis: Hackett. Book IV, Chapter V, '3.

Mabbott J.D. (1956) *An Interpretation of Mill's >Utilitarianism=@*, *Philosophical Quarterly* 6, pages 115-120, reprinted in *Theories of Ethics*, Foot P., ed., pages 137-143. Also in *Mill*, Schneewind J.B., ed., pages 179-189.

Rawls J. (1955) *Two Concepts of Rules*@, *Philosophical Review* 64, pages 3-32, reprinted in *Theories of Ethics*, Foot P., ed., pages 144-170.

Lyons D. (1965) *Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism*. Oxford. Preface and Chapter IV.

Mackie J.L.(1977) *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*. London: Penguin. Chapter 6, '4.

Quinton A. (1973) *Utilitarian Ethics*. London: Macmillan. Pages 47-54.

Questions:

1. Define and contrast act and rule utilitarianism. What is the place of rules in Mill's utilitarianism?

2. What tensions are to be found in rule utilitarianism?

3. *Following rules plays an essential part in our everyday thinking, and it should equally do so in our ethical thinking.*@ Discuss.

Consequentialism, Deontology and the Virtues

*Mill J.S., *Utilitarianism*, passim, especially Chapter V.

*Smart J.J.C. and Williams B.A.O. (1973) *Utilitarianism For and Against*. Cambridge: CUP. Smart '10; Williams '1-6. The Williams is reprinted in *Consequentialism and its Critics*, Scheffler S., ed., Oxford: OUP, 1988, pages 20-50.

*Foot P. (1985) *Utilitarianism and the Virtues*@, *Mind* 94, pages 196-209. Reprinted in

Consequentialism and its Critics, Scheffler S., ed., Oxford: OUP, 1988, pages 224-242.

*Nozick R. (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. Blackwell. Pages 26-33. Reprinted as *Aside-Constraints* in Consequentialism and its Critics, Scheffler S., ed., Oxford, 1988, pages 134-141.

Kymlicka W. (1989) Liberalism, Community, and Culture, Oxford: OUP. Chapter 3.

Nagel T. (1979) *War and Massacre*, in his *Mortal Questions*, Cambridge: CUP, pages 53-74.

Reprinted in Consequentialism and its Critics, Scheffler S., ed. Oxford: OUP, 1988, pages 51-73.

Raz J. (1986) *The Morality of Freedom*. Oxford: OUP. Chapters 7 and 8.

Sidgwick H. (1907/1981) *The Methods of Ethics*. Indianapolis: Hackett. Preface to the Sixth Edition, pages xvii to xxiii.

Questions:

1. Does consequentialism fail to take account of the importance of individuals= rights and duties?
2. AConsequentialism treats impartial benevolence as if it were the only virtue.@ Is this an accurate portrayal of consequentialism, and, if so, can it also be made out to be a criticism?

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