

University of London

M.A. Philosophy of Mind 2000-1

Term 1: Seminar Classes 6-10

## ESSAY QUESTIONS:

1. 'Both the eliminativist and the defender of folk psychology accept that the intentional categories of belief and desire cannot be reduced to the categories of the brain sciences. For the former, this shows that they must be replaced; for the latter, it shows that the study of the brain can tell us nothing about people's wants, beliefs and intentions.' Discuss.
2. 'For Davidson, the question of whether a creature has propositional attitudes is not an empirical question: the question is what sort of empirical evidence is relevant to deciding when a creature has propositional attitudes'. How is this question to be settled?
3. Is Davidson entitled to claim that the reasons for our actions are the causes of our behaviour?
4. In what sense, if any, is Dennett entitled to claim that we are intentional systems, if our behaviour is explicable from the design stance and the physical stance?
5. Is Dennett justified in thinking that beliefs just patterns in our behaviour?
6. How, according to Fodor, does science underwrite folk psychology? Is he right?
7. What problems does Fodor see in reconciling intentional psychological laws with computational explanations of our behaviour?
8. 'Scientific psychology addresses aspects of the mind that fall outside the domain of folk psychology.' Discuss.

