

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

577 0070

**MA Examination**  
for Internal Students

**PHILOSOPHY**

**Philosophy of Mind**

Monday 2 June 2008: 2.30 – 5.30pm

Candidates should answer **THREE** questions. Avoid overlap in your answers.

1. Does the causal closure of the physical imply that the mind must be physical?
2. Is mind-brain type identity the only acceptable form of physicalism about the mind?
3. 'Jackson's knowledge argument is a good argument for distinctive phenomenal concepts, but not for distinctive phenomenal properties.' Discuss.
4. 'If mind-brain identities were true, they would not appear contingent.' Discuss.
5. 'Davidson and the eliminative materialist both agree that the notions of belief and desire will find no place in a scientific description of the causes of our behaviour.' Discuss.
6. Can there be real intentional properties of creatures that can be known from only one particular point of view: the view of someone adopting the interpretative stance?
7. How successful is Fodor in vindicating the laws of intentional psychology by appeal to the laws of computational psychology?
8. We explain people's actions not just in terms of their beliefs and desires, but also in terms of their emotions and moods. Can rational psychology accommodate emotions and moods among its *explanans*?
9. Is there such a thing as inner perception of our mental states?
10. 'A person's knowledge of his or her sensations is quite unlike that person's knowledge of his or her intentional states.' Discuss.
11. Does the externalist about mental content have to conclude that psychological self-knowledge gives us *a priori* knowledge of the external world?
12. 'In making a self-ascription of belief one's eyes are, so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed outward -- upon the world'. Can this observation form the basis of a general account of psychological self-knowledge?

13. 'The physical properties of mental events suffice for their effects. So either mental properties are epiphenomenal, or they are identical to physical properties.'  
Discuss.
14. 'Content is conceptual role.' Discuss.
15. Should we accept that the environment can play a constitutive role in determining the contents of our beliefs?
16. EITHER: (a) Can the notion of causality provide the basis for an adequate account of the content of mental states?  
OR  
(b) What use is the notion of biological function in explaining mental content?

**END OF PAPER**