

1. Socrates claims (*Meno*, 85d) that finding knowledge within oneself is recollection. Is this claim justified? What is its significance in the argument of the *Meno*?
2. In the *Phaedo* what does Socrates mean by the claim that Forms are causes? Is the claim defensible?
3. Explain and assess the argument in *Republic V* regarding knowledge and belief.
4. What is the most compelling argument against the theory of Forms presented in the *Parmenides*? Can the theory survive the argument?
5. Critically comment on the following passage:

What gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower is the form of the good. And though it is the cause of knowledge and truth it is also an object of knowledge. Both knowledge and truth are beautiful things, but the good is other and more beautiful than they. In the visible world, light and sight are rightly considered sunlike, but it is wrong to think they are the sun, so here it is right to think of knowledge and truth as goodlike but wrong to think that either of them is the good - for the good is yet more prized.

....

You'll be willing to say, I think, that the sun not only provides visible things with the power to be seen but also with coming to be, growth, and nourishment, although it is not itself coming to be.

How could it be?

Therefore, you should also say that not only do objects of knowledge owe their being known to the good, but their being is also due to it, although the good is not being, but superior to it in rank and power. (Plato, *Republic VI* 508d-509b)

6. Is Socrates right to claim, in the *Protagoras*, that an art of measurement will ensure that our lives are good?
7. **Either** (a) Is Polus refuted?
Or (b) Is Callicles refuted?

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8. Critically comment on the following passage:

And in truth justice is, it seems, something of this sort. However, it isn't concerned with someone's doing his own externally, but with what is inside him, with what is truly himself and his own. One who is just does not allow any part of himself to do the work of another part or allow the various classes within him to meddle with each other. He regulates well what is really his own and rules himself. He puts himself in order, is his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts of himself like three limiting notes in a musical scale: high, low, and middle. He binds together those parts and any others there may be in between, and from having been many things he becomes entirely one, moderate and harmonious. Only then does he act. And when he does anything, whether acquiring wealth, taking care of his body, engaging in politics, or in private contracts -- in all of these, he believes that the action is just and fine that preserves this inner harmony and helps achieve it, and calls it so, and regards as wisdom the knowledge that oversees such actions. And he believes that the action that destroys this harmony is unjust, and calls it so, and regards the belief that oversees it as ignorance. (*Republic* IV 443d-444a)

9. Does Aristotle have a defensible argument for his belief that teleological explanations are necessary to explain some natural phenomena?
10. 'If there is a changeless substance [other than those which are formed by nature] the study of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal because it is first' (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VI.1). Does Aristotle have an adequate explanation of how the study of changeless substance can at the same time be universal?
11. 'A further problem presented by the affections of the soul is this: are they all affections of the composite of soul and body, or is there any one among them peculiar to the soul itself?' (Aristotle, *On the Soul* 403a3-5). What does Aristotle's answer to this question show about his understanding of the relation between soul and body?
12. How does book 1 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* bear on the debate of whether Aristotle advocates a dominant or inclusive account of *eudaimonia*?
13. Aristotle claims that '[character] virtue makes the aim right, and practical wisdom (*phronesis*) the things leading to it.' What does he mean by this? Is he right?

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14. In his discussion of akrasia Aristotle writes:

'Since the final premiss is both a judgment about something perceived and what determines actions, either a man does not have this because he is affected as he is, or he "has" it in the sense in which we said "having" was not a matter of knowing but only of talking, like the drunk with the verses of Empedocles' (*Nicomachean Ethics* VII.3, 1147b9-12).

Explain and critically assess this passage.

15. Explain and assess Aristotle's understanding of voluntary action.

16. **Either** (a) What does Aristotle mean by describing a friend as 'another self'?

Or (b) 'Aristotle's division of friendship into different kinds is not acceptable in its original form.' Discuss.

END OF PAPER