

1. 'The deepest objection to Grice's account of meaning is that he takes for granted a hearer's ability to grasp the thoughts expressed in language, when in fact apprehension of meanings comes only with grasp of those thoughts'. Discuss.
2. Can all natural language expressions of the form 'the F' be analysed as quantifier expressions?
3. Can Frege's distinction between the sense and reference of a proper name be successfully extended to other categories of expression?
4. **Either** (a) 'The linguistic behaviour of proper names that Kripke explains in terms of their being rigid could just as easily be explained by thinking of names as enjoying wide scope with respect to modal operators.' Discuss.
Or (b) If proper names should not be analysed in terms of descriptions, how do they come to have reference?
5. The sentence 'I am here now' is true whenever it is uttered but it is not necessarily true. How should we account for this fact?
6. 'Quine doesn't prove indeterminacy of translation, he merely shows that we have no way of knowing which translation is right.' Discuss.
7. How, if at all, did Tarski succeed in making the concept of truth a respectable notion in scientific inquiry?
8. Explain Davidson's use of the notion of truth to illuminate the notion of meaning. How successful is he?
9. Is Davidson's radical interpreter just Quine's radical translator by another name?
10. Suppose that *a* is a borderline case of redness. Is it coherent to classify the statement '*a* is red' as neither true nor false?
11. Is the law of bivalence the semantic mark of metaphysical realism?
12. 'A theory of meaning which compositionally assigns conditions of warranted assertibility to statements, rather than truth-conditions, is a non-starter. It cannot even provide a plausible compositional principle for "or"'. Discuss.
13. Is it a good objection to modest theories of meaning that they contribute nothing to the resolution of disputes about contested logical laws?

PLEASE TURN OVER

14. Is the knowledge that I possess when I know a language best regarded as a species of practical knowledge?
15. What is it for a speaker to succeed in telling a hearer something?
16. Is knowing a statement's truth-conditions (a) necessary and (b) sufficient for understanding it?

END OF PAPER