

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

MA PHILOSOPHY
for Internal Students

LOGIC & METAPHYSICS

Monday 13th September 1999
10.00 - 13.00

Answer THREE questions

1. What is (ontological) naturalism? Is it true?
2. EITHER (a) Are mental properties physical properties?

OR (b) "The mental supervenes on the physical." Is this true?
Is its truth (i) necessary or (ii) sufficient for the truth of materialism?
3. "Our ordinary conception of change presupposes that objects are three-dimensional, rather than four-dimensional." Discuss.
4. "No one thing exists in two different possible worlds." Are there any good reasons to think this is true?
5. EITHER (a) "Nothing is wholly present in two places at one and the same time." Is this true?

OR (b) What must a red ball and a red table have in common?
6. Are there things that don't exist?
7. Are proper names synonymous with definite descriptions?
8. Is 'exists' a predicate?
9. "Russell's theory of definite descriptions is unsatisfactory because it doesn't apply to the referential use of definite descriptions." Discuss.
10. Is truth a property?

11. EITHER (a) Do indicative conditionals have the same truth conditions as material implications?

OR (b) Is there a satisfactory analysis of subjunctive conditionals in terms of possible worlds?

12. Is there a coherent notion of time travel?

13. What is a cause?

END OF PAPER