

- 1 Expound and examine critically the view that it is *tropes*, rather than universals or particular objects, which are the most fundamental entities.
- 2 How should properties be distinguished from one another?
- 3 “Speaking of attributes, the realist says: ‘There are red houses, red roses, red sunsets; this much is prephilosophical common sense in which we must all agree. These houses, roses and sunsets, then, have something in common; and this which they have in common is all I mean by the attribute of redness’” (Quine). Is the realist right?
- 4 Does the existence of a causal relationship between A and B imply that A and B fall under some law of nature?
- 5 Can the ideas of necessary and sufficient conditions play a useful role in the analysis of causation?
- 6 ‘The referent of a speaker’s use of a name is fixed by the causal origin of the use, and not by the referent fitting some description believed by the speaker to be true of the bearer of the name.’ Discuss.
- 7 **Either** (a) Examine critically the view that there are some necessary truths which are known *a posteriori*
Or (b) Examine critically the view that there are some contingent truths which are known *a priori*.
- 8 If I assert, ‘The pub was crowded’ then I do not assert that there is only one pub in the universe. Does this fact pose a problem for Russell’s theory of descriptions?
- 9 What phenomena does Frege intend to explain by introducing the notion of sense? Can these phenomena be better explained without appealing to sense?
- 10 Are the meanings of a speaker’s words determined by the speaker’s internal states?
- 11 Kripke and the two-dimensional semanticist both attempt to explain how we can come to believe that something is possible when in fact it is impossible. Which proposed explanation is better, and why?
- 12 How, if at all, is reference to nonexistent entities possible?

END OF PAPER

