

**UNIVERSITY OF LONDON**

**577 0045**

**MA Examination**  
for Internal Students

**PHILOSOPHY**

**Epistemology and Methodology**

Monday 1 June 2009 : 2.30 – 5.30 pm

Candidates should answer **THREE** questions. Avoid overlap in your answers.

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1. EITHER: (a) In what sense, if any, is perception the foundation of empirical knowledge?  
  
OR: (b) If S's belief that p is to be epistemically justified, is it necessary that S's belief coheres with what else S believes? Is it sufficient?
2. What is it to see an object directly? Are physical objects ever seen directly?
3. Suppose S's belief that p is the result of a psychological process that usually delivers true beliefs. Does it follow that S knows that p? Does it follow that S's belief that p is justified?
4. How, if at all, is a priori justification possible?
5. "If S knows that p, then the reasons why S believes that p must be apparent to S on reflection." Discuss.
6. 'It is impossible to take radical scepticism seriously.' Discuss.
7. 'The key to responding to the argument from illusion is the notion of representation.' Discuss.
8. Are the ways in which we come to know about our own minds radically different from the ways in which we come to know about other people's minds?
9. Does my knowledge that you are angry depend on inference?
10. Suppose you know that you believe that it's raining. What is the relation between your belief that it's raining and your knowledge that you believe that it's raining?
11. 'Beliefs formed on the basis of induction are never justified.' Discuss.
12. In what sense, if any, does the observation of a white shoe confirm that all ravens are black?
13. What, if anything, is wrong with inferences involving 'grue'?

**END OF PAPER**