

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

577 0011

MA Examination
for Internal Students

PHILOSOPHY

Logic and Metaphysics

Friday 29 May 2009 : 10.00 – 1.00 pm

Candidates should answer **THREE** questions. Avoid overlap in your answers.

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Page 1 of 2

1. What are universals? Are there compelling reasons for affirming their existence?
2. Are facts anything more than true propositions?
3. Are we committed by ordinary discourse to an ontology of events?
4. Is causation a relation between events?
5. Can causation be analysed in terms of counterfactual dependence?
6. Does a theory that is committed to the existence of tropes (abstract particulars) provide a viable alternative to realism on the one hand and nominalism on the other?
7. **EITHER** (a) What, if anything, is shown by the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions?

 OR (b) 'When I say "the car won't start" I do not say that there is exactly one car. So Russell's theory of descriptions is false.' Discuss.
8. What is the strongest objection to the descriptive theory of names?
9. Are there any contingent a priori truths?
10. Does Kripke have a good argument for dualism?
11. Is there anything wrong with the view that there are non-existent things?
12. Are meanings in the head?

END OF PAPER