

1. Compare the way in which Smart, Lewis and Davidson argue for physicalism. Are any of their arguments cogent?
2. 'Functionalism has all the advantages of behaviourism and type physicalism, and none of the disadvantages.' Discuss.
3. Can a non-reductive physicalist give a satisfactory account of the causal role of mental properties?
4. 'The fact that there is something it is like to feel pain, or to see red, poses an insuperable problem for physicalism.' Discuss with reference to Kripke's modal argument and/or Jackson's knowledge argument.
5. 'A neuroscientific account of our lives will not provide theoretical categories that match up nicely with the categories of our common sense framework. Accordingly, we must expect that the older framework will simply be eliminated by a mature neuroscience.' Discuss.
6. Critically assess Davidson's claim that psychological explanation is rational explanation.
7. How plausible is Dennett's contention that beliefs and desires are real patterns?
8. Explain and assess Fodor's views about the relationship between the laws of intentional psychology and computational laws.
9. Expound and assess what you take to be the best argument for the conclusion that mental representations have some kind of content other than reference.
10. Do singular concepts, such as the concept of Cleopatra, have broad content, narrow content, both or neither?
11. **Either** (a) Expound and assess one or more arguments for the conclusion that natural kind concepts, such the concept of tigers, have narrow contents.  
**Or** (b) Is the cognitive content of at least some concepts partly determined by a thinker's social environment?
12. Critically evaluate what you take to be the best account of narrow content.
13. Is introspection best understood as a form of perception?
14. Should we give the same account for knowledge of our current sensations and knowledge of our intential states?

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15. Is psychological self-knowledge incompatible with externalist theories of mental content?
16. Are first-person avowals reports on current mental states?
17. 'Anomalous monism makes mental properties causally inert.' Discuss.
18. 'Contemporary property dualism faces the same problem in accounting for mental causation as Descartes's substance dualism. Discuss.

**END OF PAPER**