

M.A. EXAMINATION 2004

for Internal Students

PHILOSOPHY

Logic and Metaphysics

Thursday, 3 June 2004: 10.00 - 1.00.

Answer THREE questions. Avoid overlap in your answers.

1. Can causation be explained in terms of counterfactuals?
2. What are the relata of causation?
3. In virtue of what does causation have a direction?
4. How do properties differ from events and objects?
5. What is the 'one over many' problem? What is the realist's solution to this problem, and what are the strengths and weaknesses of this solution?
6. What is nominalism? How do nominalists argue against the existence of universals?
7. Is a minimalist theory of truth defensible?
8. 'Since truth is primarily a property of propositions, we cannot account for truth without appeal to propositions. But we need not appeal to any entities distinct from propositions.' Discuss.
9. 'The best account of truth will employ a notion of correspondence.' Discuss.
10. What is meant by the claim that proper names are directly referential? Is it true?
11. Is Russell right that ordinary proper names in natural language are 'usually really descriptions'?
12. EITHER (a) What are 'incomplete' definite descriptions? Does their existence show that definite descriptions cannot be understood quantificationally?

OR

- (b) Do definite descriptions have 'referential' as well as 'attributive' uses? If they do, does this show that Russell's theory of descriptions is false?

END OF PAPER