

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

MA PHILOSOPHY  
for Internal Students

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Wednesday 15th September 1999  
10.00 – 13.00

Answer THREE questions

1. If folk psychology is, as Dennett suggests, just an “idealised abstract instrumentalistic calculus of prediction”, can it offer genuine explanations of human action?
2. Is Dennett right to claim that on a small enough time-scale, there will be no determinate answer to the question of when we became conscious of some perceived event?
3. Expound and assess Fodor's claim that science underwrites folk psychology?
4. “The holistic character of the propositional attitudes makes dramatic the distinction between having some and having none.” Discuss.
5. Do we have first-person authority about our mental states? If so, what explanation can be given of such authority?
6. EITHER (a) Davidson tells us that events are mental only as described. Does this commit him to epiphenomenalism about mental content?  
OR (b) Do all physical events have physical causes? If so, can some also have mental causes?
7. “Philosophical accounts which make rationality constitutive of the mind must be wrong, because they cannot explain irrationality.” Discuss.
8. “If folk psychology cannot be reduced to neuroscience, it must be eliminated.” Discuss.
9. Compare the identification of pain with a brain process and the identification of lightning with an electrical discharge.
10. In what ways, if any, does thought depend upon language?

11. How can mere computational mechanisms implement intentional psychological laws?
12. What are emotions?
13. What is the problem of consciousness? Are there compelling reasons to believe that it is insoluble?

END OF PAPER