

M.A. EXAMINATION 2005

for Internal Students

PHILOSOPHY

Wittgenstein

Tuesday, 24 May 2005: 10.00 – 1.00

Answer THREE questions. Avoid overlap in your answers.

1. How, in the *Tractatus*, are language and world related?
2. What is it, according to the *Tractatus*, that all forms of representation have in common?
3. In what sense, if any, does Wittgenstein think philosophy is elucidatory nonsense?
4. Is Wittgenstein's argument in the *Tractatus* for determinacy of sense cogent?
5. 'Solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism' (Wittgenstein). What does this mean? Is Wittgenstein right?
6. How plausible is the doctrine that all necessities are rooted in tautologies?
7. 'But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means we can't talk about "right"' (Wittgenstein). What argument is Wittgenstein concluding here? Is the argument sound?
8. EITHER (a) What, if anything, is wrong with the suggestion that the right way to follow a rule is the way we are disposed to follow it?
OR (b) Is the rule-following paradox intended as a *reductio ad absurdum*?
9. How is 'I am in pain' used, according to the *Philosophical Investigations*? Is Wittgenstein's account correct?
10. What, according to Wittgenstein, explains the 'hardness of the logical *must*'? Is he right?
11. How plausible is the later Wittgenstein's approach to the problem of other minds?

12. How plausible is Wittgenstein's suggestion that I use the word 'red' to stand for an idea in my mind?

END OF PAPER