

**UNIVERSITY OF LONDON**  
**M PHIL EXAMINATIONS 2005**  
**for internal students**

**BERKELEY**

Candidates should answer THREE of the following questions. Please avoid overlap in your answers.

1. What use did Berkeley make of the principle that nothing can be anything like a sensation or idea but another sensation or idea? Is this a defensible principle?
2. 'Hence it is plain that the very Notion of what is called *Matter* or *Corporeal Substance*, involves a Contradiction in it' (*Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 9). Describe and analyse the arguments that Berkeley gave for this conclusion.
3. Kant described Berkeley as 'having degraded bodies to mere illusion'. What response would Berkeley have given to this kind of criticism? How satisfactory is it?
4. What did Berkeley dislike about the corpuscularian natural philosophy of Boyle and Locke? What kind of natural philosophy did he himself recommend in its stead?
5. Is there a valid argument from Berkeley's criticism of the theory of abstract ideas to his anti-matter views?
6. 'Berkeley's system is unworkable without God, and was intended to be unworkable without God.' Discuss.
7. Does Berkeley provide an account of general term meaning which is better than that provided by Locke?
8. 'It will be objected that we see things actually without or at a distance from us' (*Principles of Human Knowledge* §42). Does Berkeley satisfactorily engage with this objection?
9. In what sense if any does the *Principles* give an account of human *knowledge*?
10. Does the Master Argument rest on a quantifier shift fallacy?
11. 'Berkeley provides as much reason to reject spiritual substance as he does to reject material substance.' Discuss.

**END OF PAPER**