

**UNIVERSITY OF LONDON**

**M.Phil. EXAMINATION**  
for Internal Students

**PHILOSOPHY**

**Philosophy of Language**

Wednesday, 10 May 2006: 10.00 – 13.00

Candidates should answer **THREE** of the following **TWELVE** questions, avoiding overlap in their answers, also between papers.

1. Does the content of an assertion supervene on the syntax of the sentence uttered?
2. Can the Russellian provide a satisfactory treatment of incomplete definite descriptions?
3. Does the requirement of compositionality place any constraints on the meaning of an expression?
4. Does Davidsonian semantics give us reality without reference?
5. Critically assess Chomsky's claim that language has no reality beyond its mental representation in the minds of speakers.
6. Can metaphors be explained by the loosening, broadening or restricting of the applications of words?
7. What problems are there for the view that predicates have reference? Can they be solved?
8. Is the comprehension of speech a matter of deploying a semantic theory?
9. Are vague predicates coherent?
10. 'There is no such thing as a literal meaning.' Discuss.
11. Is the expression 'that painting' a singular term, a quantifier, or neither?
12. Are any expressions in natural language directly referential?

**END OF PAPER**