

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
M PHIL EXAMINATIONS 2005
For internal students

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS

Candidates should answer THREE questions. Please avoid overlap in your answers.

1. Do events change from future to present to past?
2. What role, if any, should the concept of memory play in an account of personal identity?
3. What makes (or would make) an action a free action?
4. Are natural language indicative conditionals truth-functional defensible?
5. What, if anything, does something's being imaginable show about its being possible?
6. Should a material thing be identified with its matter?
7. Is there is a difference of kind between all the particulars on the one hand and all the universals on the other hand?
8. 'Problems about vagueness arise only when we assume that the meaning of a term does all the work in fixing correct applications of the term.' Discuss.
9. What is minimalism about truth? Is it defensible?
10. Does the informativeness of true identity sentences give us good reason to invoke semantic features of words over and above their ordinary referents?
11. Does tensing the copula help to solve the problem of intrinsic change?
12. Do 'finkish' dispositions refute an analysis of dispositions in terms of counterfactuals?
13. 'Aside from the contextual variation attaching to any quantifier expression, the semantics of definite descriptions is context-invariant.' Discuss.

TURN OVER

14. 'Causation is a primitive feature of the world and cannot be reduced, or explained in other terms.' Discuss.

15. Is there an acceptable form of non-reductive physicalism? If so, explain it. If not, explain why.

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