

**UNIVERSITY OF LONDON**

**M.Phil. EXAMINATION**  
for Internal Students

**PHILOSOPHY**

**Philosophy of Mind**

Monday, 8 May 2006: 10.00 – 13.00

Candidates should answer **THREE** of the following **TWELVE** questions, avoiding overlap in their answers, also between papers.

1. 'It is part of the meaning of the term "qualia" that it should be obvious to one whether one has them, and what they are like. Therefore, there should be no dispute about the existence of qualia. But there is; so there are no qualia.' Discuss.
2. 'Non-reductive physicalism is rendered unmotivated by its commitment to the non-homogeneity of mental and physical causation.' Explain and assess.
3. For a mental state to be conscious, is it necessary that a subject has, or is capable of having, a thought about it? Is it sufficient?
4. 'Anxiety and depression can be irrational and objectless. So they cannot be intentional states.' Discuss.
5. 'Since the content of mental states is conceptual, non-human animals cannot have contentful mental states.' Discuss.
6. 'The intentional theory of perception fails because it cannot account for the difference between perception and thought.' Explain and assess.
7. Is eliminativism self-refuting?
8. Does the notion of a volition have anything to offer action theory?
9. 'The fact that one can look at an object carefully and deliberately shows that seeing something can be an act of will.' Discuss.
10. What role do intentions play in the motivation of action?
11. Is pain a mode of bodily perception?
12. Can an appeal to a failure of warrant transmission establish that privileged access to one's own mental states and externalism about mental content do not entail knowledge of facts about the environment?

**END OF PAPER**