

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

M.Phil. EXAMINATION
for Internal Students

PHILOSOPHY

Plato

Wednesday, 10 May 2006: 10.00 – 13.00

Candidates should answer **THREE** of the following **TWELVE** questions, avoiding overlap in their answers, also between papers.

1. Is the Socratic elenchus a useful method for discovering the truth?
2. How cogent is Socrates' denial in the *Protagoras* of the possibility of action contrary to the agent's judgement of what is best?
3. How does Meno's paradox arise out of Socrates' examination of Meno in the first half of the *Meno*? Is the theory of recollection needed to meet it?
4. According to the *Phaedo*, is it necessary to recollect the form, Equal, in order to have the thought 'this stick is equal to that one'? If not, what does our recollection of the form, Equal, add to our awareness of the equal sticks and stones?
5. In the *Republic*, Glaucon and Adeimantus challenge Socrates to show that justice is good in itself. What do they mean by 'good in itself'? Are they right to think that a true defence of justice must show that it is good in this way?
6. 'Plato had no logical or psychological arguments for going beyond two parts of the soul' (Penner). Discuss.
7. How, and how successfully, does Socrates distinguish between knowledge and belief in *Republic V*?
8. Does Plato provide any good arguments for why the philosopher should return into the Cave?
9. Does Plato think that one can have knowledge either of how things are, or of how they should be, in the sensible world?
10. Do all Plato's arguments for the immortality of the soul fail to prove from its essence that it cannot simply cease to exist?
11. Does the Third Man Argument refute the Theory of Forms?
12. Does Plato have good reasons for supposing that perception is not knowledge?

END OF PAPER