

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

M.Phil. EXAMINATION
for Internal Students

PHILOSOPHY

Wittgenstein

Monday, 8 May 2006: 10.00 – 13.00

Candidates should answer **THREE** of the following **TWELVE** questions, avoiding overlap in their answers, also between papers.

1. What does Wittgenstein mean by 'Occam's Razor'? Did his view of it change over time? If so, how?
2. What is the general form of a proposition? How did Wittgenstein's view of this change over time?
3. Is what is possible an entirely arbitrary matter for Wittgenstein? Did his view on this evolve?
4. If I judge something about my sensations ('This throbbing in my head is slowing down/It is getting fainter/It will stop soon', etc.), what am I judging about? Discuss Wittgenstein's view on this (and, if you wish, its origins).
5. What would make an experience private (in a way which is philosophically problematic)?
6. What, for later Wittgenstein, is the difference between explanation and interpretation?
7. Is Wittgenstein a minimalist (or redundancy theorist) about truth? Is there any way in which ' p is true iff p ' may be, for him, misleading?
8. 'If I say falsely of something that it is *red*, then, for all that, it isn't *red*.' Late Wittgenstein tells us that the harmony of thought and reality consists in that. Why the 'for all that'? And what, then, is this harmony?
9. How, according to Wittgenstein, did Augustine go wrong?
10. What, for Wittgenstein, goes wrong with philosophical idealism? How does the answer to this differ from early to late Wittgenstein?
11. Are hinge propositions really propositions?
12. Does Wittgenstein tolerate the idea of different standards for knowledge?

END OF PAPER