

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

M. PHIL. EXAMINATION 1999 for Internal Students

PHILOSOPHY

Monday, 10 May. 10.00 - 1.00.

Frege

Answer THREE questions.

1. How does the *Begriffsschrift* notion of *content* connect to the distinction between *sense* and *reference*?
2. 'Identity of object I express by identity of sign, and not by using a sign for identity. Difference of objects I express by difference of signs. ... The identity-sign, therefore, is not an essential constituent of conceptual notation' (L. Wittgenstein: *Tractatus*, 5.53 and 5.533). What would Frege respond to Wittgenstein?
3. According to Frege, can we talk about concepts in the way in which we talk about, for instance, Mount Everest?
4. Can Frege endorse consistently both the Context Principle and the Principle of Compositionality?
5. Does the treatment of sentences such as 'John believes that Mary said that Ann believes that 2 is prime' commit Frege to an infinite hierarchy of senses?
6. Why does Frege consider that the reference of a sentence is its truth-value? Can the view be defended?
7. Was Frege right in believing that the universal and the existential quantifier are second-level predicates?
8. 'If someone wants to say today what he expressed yesterday using the word 'today', he will replace this word with 'yesterday'. Although the thought is the same the verbal expression must be different' (Frege). Discuss.

9. How would Frege prove the existence of the number five?

10. Discuss Frege's views about the empiricist conception of mathematics.

11. Why was Russell's paradox so catastrophic for Frege? Could the damage be repaired?

12. Why should Frege be concerned to prove the falsity of the statement that the number two is identical with Julius Caesar?

END OF PAPER