

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

M.Phil. EXAMINATION
for Internal Students

PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy of Language

Tuesday, 8 May 2007: 10.00 – 13.00

Candidates should answer **THREE** of the following **TWELVE** questions, avoiding overlap in their answers, also between papers.

1. “‘I’ is a name I call myself.’ To what extent does this capture the meaning of ‘I’ in English?
2. Is there an adequate truth-conditional treatment of non-indicative sentences?
3. In what respects (if any) is the sentence, ‘It is raining’, semantically incomplete?
4. ‘The failure of substitution of co-referring terms *salve veritate* within belief contexts shows that there is no compositional semantics for belief reports.’ Does it?
5. Are any expressions of natural language ‘directly referential’?
6. ‘Compositionality of meaning imposes no interesting constraints on the shape of a theory of meaning.’ Discuss.
7. Can two speakers share a natural language?
8. Does meaning supervene on use?
9. ‘Understanding a language cannot be *knowing* what words mean because one can perfectly well understand what someone has said when they utter the words “Jones is a berk” without being justified in believing that “berk” means *fool*.’ Discuss.
10. ‘A leaf may count as green under some understandings of “green” and not under others. So understanding what has been said by the words, “That leaf is green” cannot be knowing under what conditions “That leaf is green” is true.’ Discuss.
11. What basis is there, if any, for distinguishing between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary acts performed by making an utterance?
12. Does Davidsonian semantics accord a proper role to the notion of reference?

END OF PAPER