

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

M. PHIL. EXAMINATION 1999 for Internal Students

PHILOSOPHY

Tuesday, 11 May. 10.00 - 1.00.

Logic and Metaphysics

Answer THREE questions.

1. 'Like "some pig" or "each pig", "the pig" is a quantifier phrase.' Discuss.
2. 'If proper names are devices of direct reference, then Frege's puzzle of identity is insoluble.' Discuss.
3. Does a treatment of vagueness in terms of supervaluations succeed?
4. Do indicative conditionals have truth-conditions?
5. 'The best account of intrinsic change presupposes presentism.' Discuss.
6. Explain and assess the claim that a cause makes its effects more probable than they would have been if the cause had been absent.
7. 'The laws depend on what we do — not causally, of course, but counterfactually.' Does this claim enable us to rebut the so-called 'consequence argument' for incompatibilism?
8. 'According to minimalist theories of truth, a false proposition is one which is not true. Therefore minimalist theories of truth are unable to account for truth-value gaps.' Discuss.
9. Is 'exists' a predicate true of everything?
10. 'Just as we should not assume that each name corresponds to an object, we should not assume that each predicate corresponds to a property.' Is this true? If it is, then how should we understand the relation between properties and predicates?
11. In what sense of 'is', if any, is a human person an animal?

12. 'Events are always changes in substances. So events are not ontologically fundamental.' Discuss.

13. Can one consistently believe both that everything is physical and that there are abstract entities like numbers, propositions or abstract universals?

14. 'The idea of a possible world can only be used to illustrate metaphysical necessity and possibility; it cannot give an explanation of necessity and possibility.' Discuss.

END OF PAPER