

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

M. PHIL. EXAMINATION 1999 for Internal Students

PHILOSOPHY

Tuesday, 11 May. 10.00 - 1.00.

Philosophy of Language

Answer THREE questions.

1. Explain and assess Russell's (post-1905) view that the logical form of 'Some man is bald' is not subject-predicate.
2. Expound and assess Quine's view that any attempt to quantify into modal contexts leads to nonsense.
3. Can the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions be interpreted coherently as a semantic distinction?
4. Does the claim that names are rigid designators contradict the claim that a name is synonymous with some definite description?
5. Why shouldn't we interpret utterances such as 'I promise to be there tomorrow' as simply reporting the speaker's promise?
6. How should a semantic theory treat demonstratives?
7. Can a Davidsonian truth-theory for a language serve as a theory of meaning for that language?
8. Is knowledge of a language a matter of abilities and dispositions?
9. In what sense, if any, is language conventional?
10. 'The central notion in a theory of meaning for a language should be the notion of verification.' Discuss.

11. How should a semantic theory treat reports of propositional attitudes?

12. What phenomena can the concept of conversational implicature help to explain?

END OF PAPER