

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
M PHIL EXAMINATIONS 2004
for internal students

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS

Candidates should answer THREE of the following questions. Please avoid overlap in your answers.

1. 'If you know "Either not-A or B" then you can be sure that "If A, then B". But "Either not-A or B" is true just in case A is false or B is true. So "If A, then B" will be true whenever A is false.' What, if anything, has gone wrong here?
2. 'Zombies are certainly conceivable. So physicalism is false.' Discuss.
3. EITHER (a) Does every true sentence have a truth-maker?

OR (b) Is the disquotational Truth Schema the whole truth about the truth?
4. 'We will do better to explain counterfactuals in terms of causation, rather than vice versa.' Discuss.
5. In what sense, if any, can a statement truly assert an identity yet not be necessary?
6. Could I truly say 'That man over there is drinking a martini' and yet be pointing to a woman?
7. 'If Peter is lazy, he has at least one vice. This seems trivially true. But for it to be true, predicates like 'is wise' must commit us to the existence of properties, for instance, vices.' Is this a convincing argument?
8. Does persistence require the postulation of temporal parts?
9. 'There can be no time without change.' Discuss.
10. Is there a coherent theory of personal identity?
11. 'To act freely is to do what you want because you want to.' Discuss.
12. 'An adequate theory of vagueness must have three parts: an epistemology, semantics and metaphysics of borderline cases.' Discuss.
13. What assumptions lie behind Frege's puzzle? What is the best response to the puzzle?
14. Must a physicalist be a reductionist?

END OF PAPER