

**UNIVERSITY OF LONDON**  
**M PHIL EXAMINATIONS 2004**  
**for internal students**

**PHILOSOPHY OF MIND**

Candidates should answer THREE of the following questions. Please avoid overlap in your answers.

1. Is the thesis of the necessary supervenience of the conscious on the physical sufficient to close the 'explanatory gap'?
2. 'The most plausible forms of physicalism end up making the mental causally inert.' Discuss.
3. Critically assess the view that for a mental state to be conscious is for its subject to have, or to be capable of having, a thought about it.
4. 'All that the disjunctivist theory of perception amounts to is the claim that genuine perception involves a relation to a mind-independent object, whereas a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination does not. But many other theories of perception accept this. Therefore the disjunctivist theory is not an interestingly distinctive position.' Is this correct?
5. 'Concepts are mental representations.' What does this mean? Is it true?
6. Can decisions be fully explained in terms of desire and belief?
7. 'The problem with causal theories of action is that they do not distinguish actions from mere happenings which are caused in a certain way.' Discuss.
8. Should emotions be understood in terms of the propositional attitudes? If not, why not? If so, in what way?
9. Explain what you take to be the distinction between intentional and non-intentional mental properties. Are there conscious states which have no intentional properties? Are there intentional states which have non-intentional mental properties?
10. 'If the best way to understand the content of intentional states is as constituted by objects and properties, then all intentional content is non-conceptual'. Discuss.
11. How can a causal or informational theory of representation explain the fact that we can think about things which do not exist?
12. Is the self a substance?

**TURN OVER**

13. Is self-knowledge compatible with externalism about the mind?

**END OF PAPER**