

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON  
MPHIL EXAMINATIONS 2001  
for internal students

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Thursday 17th May 2001: 10:00 – 1:00

Candidates should answer THREE of the following questions. Please avoid overlap in your answers.

1. 'All forms of physicalism are reductive in one way or another.' Is this true?
2. Does the truth of physicalism require that consciousness be explained in physical terms? If so, what form should this explanation take? If not, why not?
3. EITHER (a) 'Physicalists can only solve the problem of mental causation if they can establish a metaphysically necessary relation between mental and physical phenomena.' Discuss.  
OR (b) Is the problem of the causal efficacy of content only a problem for externalists?
4. What are qualia? Should all aspects of consciousness be understood in terms of qualia? Should any?
5. 'To identify a phenomenon as mental is to locate it within the space of reasons.' What does this mean? Is it true?
6. What is a propositional attitude? Are all intentional states propositional attitudes?

PLEASE TURN OVER

7. EITHER (a) 'Internalists about mental content must treat all content as essentially disjunctive.' Discuss.  
OR (b) 'If one denies the object-dependence of perceptual content, then one is committed to the view that all perceptual content is purely general.' Discuss.
8. 'The nature of the mind cannot be explained in terms of the idea of interpretation, since this idea presupposes mentality.' Discuss.
9. What is to be said in favour of the view that the Will is an irreducible faculty of the mind?
10. Expound and defend what you take to be the best account of practical reasoning.

11. 'What we call the emotions form a diverse and heterogenous grouping of states, events and traits; we should not expect there to be a unified account of these phenomena.' Discuss.

12. What is it to possess a concept?

13. 'Introspection is an outdated, "Cartesian" concept", which should have no place in a proper account of the mind.' Discuss.

END OF PAPER