

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
MPHIL EXAMINATIONS 2001
for internal students

PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY

Tuesday 15th May 2001: 10:00 – 1:00

Candidates should answer THREE of the following Questions. Please avoid overlap in your answers

1. In what sense, if any, is the mind modular?
2. How might folk psychological assumptions constrain investigations in psychology and cognitive science.
3. 'The Simulation Theory merely describes how we occasionally think about the minds of others; therefore it cannot provide a proper alternative to the Theory Theory.' Discuss.
4. How, if at all, does neuroscientific evidence shed light on consciousness?
5. EITHER (a) 'Psychology is not concerned with the question of whether intentional states are externalistically individuated; therefore philosophy should not be so concerned.' Discuss.
OR (b) 'Psychology does employ intentional notions, but it has no place for the idea of the unique content of an intentional state.' Discuss.
6. Do we have tacit knowledge of a grammar for our own language?
7. What is the Language of Thought hypothesis? Is it true?

PLEASE TURN OVER

8. 'Connectionism cannot account for the systematicity of cognition.' Discuss.
9. What is nativism? To what extent, if any, is it true of humans?
10. Does the claim that psychoanalysis is a sound extension of commonsense psychology provide an adequate response to the charge that it is unscientific?
11. In what sense, if any, can mental disorder be an illness?

12. Does Freud's postulation of unconscious motives help to explain akrasia and/or self deception?

13. Does recent work in neuroscience support Freud's theory of dreams?

END OF PAPER