

**UNIVERSITY OF LONDON**  
**M PHIL EXAMINATIONS 2004**  
**for internal students**

**THE PHILOSOPHY OF WITTGENSTEIN**

Candidates should answer THREE of the following questions. Please avoid overlap in your answers.

1. 'Wittgenstein says that the reader of the *Tractatus* who understands *him* will come to regard *his sentences* as senseless. This is a consistent position.' Discuss.
2. Assess Wittgenstein's grounds for the claim that reality can be analysed into simple objects and sentences into simple signs.
3. Did the early Wittgenstein hold that both sentences and mental states like intention were pictures? Is this view defensible?
4. EITHER (a) How far does Wittgenstein agree with the solipsist in holding that the world is my world?  
  
OR (b) How does Wittgenstein's distinction between saying and showing apply to the claim that the world is my world?
5. Explain and assess Wittgenstein's claim in *Philosophical Remarks* that an intention 'contains a general rule'.
6. At *Philosophical Grammar* §62 Wittgenstein says 'That's *him* (this picture represents him) – that contains the whole problem of representation'. What problem does he refer to here, and why was it important for his philosophy?
7. What problem does Wittgenstein raise in asking 'How can a rule show me what I have to do at this point?', and how does he try to resolve it?
8. If meaning is use, why is a word used for a private sensation supposed to be meaningless?
9. Does Wittgenstein hold that a sensation is 'not a something, but not a nothing either'? What does this mean, and is it true?
10. Do Wittgenstein's remarks on rules undermine 'the hardness of the logical must'?

**TURN OVER**

11. Discuss Wittgenstein's claim that the mathematician creates essence.

12. Does *On Certainty* contain any answer to traditional scepticism?

**END OF PAPER**