

**UNIVERSITY OF LONDON**  
**MPHIL EXAMINATIONS**  
**for internal students**

**Philosophy of Wittgenstein**

**10:00-13:00, Monday 13th May, 2002**

Candidates should answer THREE of the following questions.

Please avoid overlap in your answers.

1. 'When Wittgenstein tells us that, if the world did not contain simple objects, we could not say anything meaningful about it, he is telling us nothing about the fabric of reality.' Discuss
2. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein claims both that language can disguise thought and that language is in good order. Can these two claims be reconciled?
3. Expound and assess Wittgenstein's claim in the Tractatus that propositions such as '*a* believes that *p*' is the form "*p* says *p*".
4. 'For propositions to be true or false pictures of reality, the parts of a proposition must stand for elements of the pictured scene. But Wittgenstein offers us no account of how they can do so.' Discuss.
5. Can Wittgenstein legitimately claim in the Tractatus that a proposition can have meaning irrespective of how things stand with the state of affairs portrayed?

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6. The slogan that meaning is use, is open to more than one interpretation. How should the slogan be interpreted in Wittgenstein's philosophy and what work does it do in his later writings?
  
7. EITHER (a) Wittgenstein suggests that what a rule requires of us at any point is more a matter of decision than of judgement? What does he mean and how does this idea illuminate the nature of rule-following.  
  
OR (b) What role does Wittgenstein take the community to play in showing how there can be such a thing as an individual's following a rule?
  
8. Just because the speaker of a private language cannot distinguish between what is right and what seems right about the use of a term, that doesn't mean there is no right way to use the term.' Discuss.
  
9. Why does Wittgenstein suppose that when one says 'I intend to leave the room' one is not issuing a report on a state of affairs? Is he right?
  
10. Is it Wittgenstein's understanding of mathematical proof consistent with his view that philosophy should leave everything as it is?
  
11. Is Wittgenstein offering a principled distinction between hinge propositions and others in *On Certainty*? If not, how can he respond to the

sceptic? If so. how can this be reconciled with his claim that we should not construct theories in Philosophy?

END OF PAPER