

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON  
MPHIL EXAMINATIONS 2001  
for internal students

THE PHILOSOPHY OF WITTGENSTEIN

Wednesday 16th May 2001: 10:00 – 1:00

Candidates should answer THREE of the following questions. Please avoid overlap in your answers.

1. Critically assess Wittgenstein's claim in the Tractatus that unless the world consisted of simples we could say nothing true or false about it.
2. What philosophical work does Wittgenstein intend the saying/ showing distinction to perform in Tractatus? How successful is this aim?
3. Why does Wittgenstein claim that logical propositions are senseless? Is this claim intelligible?
4. Explain and assess Wittgenstein's claim, in the Tractatus, that solipsism and realism coincide.
5. Examine Wittgenstein's arguments in the Tractatus for the claim that the logical constants do not stand for objects. What is the philosophical importance of this claim?
6. How could Wittgenstein allow that we ever know the meaning of a word, if a word's meaning is given by the unfolding of its use through time?
7. Is Wittgenstein entitled to claim that there is a way of grasping a rule that is not an interpretation of it?

PLEASE TURN OVER

8. Why might one be tempted to view the Philosophical Investigations as defending 'behaviourism.' Would this view be justified?
9. What does Wittgenstein mean by a 'language-game'? What is the philosophical interest of this idea?
10. What response to scepticism about the existence of 'other minds' is suggested by the Philosophical Investigations?
11. 'Mathematical truth is a matter ultimately of our decision.' Is this a consequence of Wittgenstein's views in the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics?

12. 'I should like to say: Moore does not know what he asserts he knows, but it stands fast for him, as also for me; regarding it as absolutely solid is part of our method of doubt and enquiry.' (On Certainty)  
Examine the point about knowledge and doubt that Wittgenstein is making here.

END OF PAPER